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I study the role of licensed technologies in the R&D development process, the knowledge 
assimilation mechanism and the patent litigation procedure. I document that the use and 
adoption of licensed technologies is not a linear process and it has important strategic 
consequences. First, I focus on the joint effect of external and internal technologies and 
possible firm-level drivers of this relation. I find that, on average, internal R&D and 
licensing investments are neither complements nor substitutes. However, firms with 
higher levels of absorptive capacity, economies of scope, and past licensing experience 
are able to create positive synergies by combining the two types of investments. In 
addition, I find that the integration and the adoption of external technology may be 
limited by internal knowledge accumulation. Firms that experience an inward oriented 
knowledge accumulation process need to balance the trade-off between internal 
knowledge reliance and external knowledge assimilation. The negative relation between 
internal and external knowledge is positively mitigated by two organizational factors: 
absorptive capacity and the level of decentralization. Finally, assuming that companies 
are able to adopt external technologies, I find that licensed patents are more reliable than 
internal ones. In other words, external patents increase the probability of winning a patent 
lawsuit. Under this circumstance, firms are able to reduce patent uncertainty, limit market 










The conceptual framework of this dissertation lies at the intersection of strategy, 
innovation, markets for technology, and organizational theory research. The objective of 
this dissertation is to analyze two broad questions. First, are firms able to assimilate and 
integrate external knowledge with their existing knowledge and under what 
circumstances are firms more successful in this process? Second, how can firms exploit 
licensed technologies as a defensive strategy against market entry? In particular, I attempt 
to address these questions by looking at the firm-level of analysis and by trying to 
understand the role played by licensed patents under several circumstances: R&D 
development, knowledge assimilation and patent litigation. Addressing these questions 
requires an interdisciplinary approach; specifically, I draw insights from different streams 
of research including organizational theory, innovation research, the knowledge-based 
view of the firm, sociology, and economics. In this introduction, I briefly describe the 
three main chapters of my dissertation and highlight the main contributions. 
I look at technologies developed outside of the firms’ boundaries and I make an 
effort to identify the potential benefits and threats associated with their adoption. A large 
body of innovation research has examined the capabilities that firms possess in order to 
be innovative. Existing research has primarily focused on the role and antecedents of 
technologies that were produced internally and licensed out. However, firms exploit 
external technologies to boost their innovative performance; this in-licensing process 




important to understand how companies can benefit from their licensing strategy. To 
address this gap, I examine the impact of licensing investments on both sales and 
innovative performance when combined with internal knowledge. I document how 
licensed technologies can have a positive impact only under specific circumstances. In 
the three chapters of my dissertation, I examine the effect of acquired knowledge on 
firms’ innovative output, sales performance, and patent litigation outcomes. The general 
setting of this dissertation is the pharmaceutical industry. I use multiple databases to 
follow a largely representative sample of incumbent firms. I primarily rely on licensing 
data as a measure of external technology acquisition and patent data to analyze drug 
litigations.  
In the first chapter, I argue that a focus on the average relation between internal 
R&D and external technology may be misleading. I find that the level of 
complementarity and substitutability varies conditional on the existing capabilities of the 
firm. I attempt to provide a deeper understanding of the firm-level drivers of 
complementarity between these two types of investments through the structural 
estimation of a flexible innovation production function. Results suggest that on average 
internal R&D and in-licensing investments are neither complements nor substitutes, thus 
suggesting a complex relationship between the two forms of investments. In addition, I 
find that the degree of complementarity is enhanced for firms with stronger absorptive 
capacity, economies of scope, and past licensing experience. Overall, this chapter 
establishes the importance of firms’ existing capabilities to create synergies between 




In the second chapter, I combine the markets for technology framework and 
research on organizational boundaries to examine the impact of internal knowledge 
accumulation and licensing acquisitions. I argue that when firms specialize in internal 
knowledge and adopt an inward oriented knowledge accumulation process, they can be 
reluctant to adopt external technologies. While recent studies have emphasized the 
importance of combining technologies from different sources, there is a lack of attention 
on the integration of external technologies into innovative production. This chapter 
focuses on the potential tension between external knowledge acquisition and internal 
knowledge accumulation. My results show that reliance on existing knowledge reduces 
the marginal effect of licensed technologies on firm market capitalization. As a 
consequence, this inward attitude may conflict with the exploitation of external 
technologies, thereby limiting the potential benefits associated with the markets for 
technology. I also find that higher level of absorptive capacity and a decentralized 
organizational structure moderate the negative bias towards external technologies. In 
essence, this chapter analyzes the relationship between internal knowledge and in-
licensing investments, showcasing how companies can reduce the trade-off between 
internal knowledge accumulation and external technologies. 
In the third chapter, I assume that firms are able to assimilate and adopt external 
patents and I examine how these technologies can be used as a defense mechanism to 
prevent market entry. Past research has considered when and why firms may choose to 
access the markets for technology.  However, in the case of licensing little is known 
about the reliability of these external patents.  “Weak” external patents can expose a firm 




where development cycles are long, the loss of a revenue stream due to litigation can be a 
significant event.  I focus on a unique legal action called a “Paragraph IV challenge” that 
is peculiar to the U.S. market: under specific circumstances, generic manufacturers may 
enter the market five years after drug commercialization and before patent expiration. 
This setting offers a natural experiment to test whether external technologies are more 
reliable than those developed internally. I find that acquired patents are more reliable than 
internal technologies, thus suggesting that the due diligence process effectively selects 
the best technologies. I also show that more profitable drugs have a higher probability of 
being challenged, further, the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act lowered litigation costs 









Markets for technology have been extensively studied (Arora and Gambardella, 
1990, 1994a); however, there still remains little evidence about the determinants of 
technology demand in terms of the relationship between internal and external R&D 
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990). Firms choose their level of integration within the value 
chain, but the extent to which they adopt different R&D strategies as substitutes or 
complements remains uncertain. It is possible to identify three different scenarios: 
vertical disintegration, vertical integration and intermediate levels of integration. 
Some firms, such as Morgan Stanley, have advocated a radical shift for the 
management of R&D in certain industries (Morgan Stanley, 2010; Shapiro, 2003). In 
particular, they argue that the pharmaceutical industry should abandon its current R&D 
model and fully adopt a “search and development” (S&D) model. Under an S&D 
framework firms would abandon all internal research and focus solely on development. 
Thus, 100% of a firm’s drug candidates would come from external licensing and firms 
would adopt a vertical disintegrated structure. an opposite view is proposed by Pisano 
(2006), the author critizes a “market-based” organization sice it has not delived the 
promised innovation and reduction in R&D costs. Pharmaceutical firms should 
implement a more integrated structure to deal with R&D uncertainty and with the lack of 
results from the biotech sector. Under this view, firms should become knowledge 




For example, pharmaceutical companies should not sign 40 agrements per year but they 
should sign four or five agreements that focus on specific therapeutic areas or target 
families. While full adoption of an S&D model or a vertical integrated structure is an 
extreme position, some pharmaceutical companies have openly acknowledged a move 
toward intermediate level of integration based on more frequent engagement in external 
licensing. For example, in 2009, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) terminated its legendary 
neuroscience program in order to free up capital to meet its stated goal of allocating 50% 
of its R&D budget to external projects (Knowles and Higgins, 2011). 
The S&D model implicitly suggests that internal and external R&D are substitute 
activities in the sense that implementation of one activity reduces marginal return on the 
other activity. Complementarity would arise if an increase in one of these activities 
increased the marginal returns from the other activity (Gans and Stern, 2003). 
Substitution between these activities is consistent with the extreme case of backward 
integration, whereby firms rely exclusively on internal R&D investments. Backward 
integration dominated the organization of R&D in the past century. Substitution is also 
consistent with the opposite case, whereby a non-integrated firm relies exclusively on 
external technology, perhaps yet to be developed, as in the case of the S&D model. 
Ultimately, the decision to choose between these two types of R&D is influenced by 
whether synergies exist between them. For example, internal R&D and licensing could 
fulfill quite distinct yet complementary purposes. R&D can serve functions not directly 
tied to the creation of new products, such as concept exploration, hypothesis testing, and 
market credibility, which are all activities that can complement the investment made on a 




Our review of the literature suggests that empirical evidence does not 
conclusively support substitution or complementarity across all industry settings. 
Moreover, there is surprisingly little research on the contextual factors that determine 
whether these two activities are complements or substitutes. Accordingly, the major 
objective of this paper is to provide a deeper understanding of the firm-level drivers that 
determine the degree of complementarity between internal and external R&D. To 
accomplish our goal, we adopt a two-step empirical strategy. In the first step, we estimate 
the coefficients of a flexible CES-Translog innovation production function (Pollak et al., 
1984) to find the most appropriate functional form to use in our context. We then provide 
structural estimates of the degree of complementarity or substitutability between these 
two types of R&D investments that vary across firms and time.  
Our study is focused on the global pharmaceutical industry, which is an ideal 
research setting for several reasons. In the pharmaceutical industry, internal productivity 
failures and the lack of capabilities in emerging technology, coupled with an increase in 
new external opportunities, have influenced the balance between internal R&D and in-
licensing strategies (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000). Furthermore, internal and external 
R&D are considered major drivers of firm performance (Scherer, 2007). Finally, the 
detailed availability of longitudinal measures relating to both internal and external 
research activities and their product innovation output allows us to directly analyze the 
marginal productivity of these investments and drivers.  
Our results suggest that, on average, internal R&D and in-licensing investments 
are neither complements nor substitutes in the global pharmaceutical industry. However, 




absorptive capacity, economies of scope, and past licensing experience. Taken together, 
our results highlight the complexity of this relation and suggest that a simple 
categorization (complement or substitute) may be misleading. In such a context, the 
framework presented in this paper appears to be valuable, since it recognizes the 
importance of heterogeneity across firms in terms of affecting complementarity of 
internal and external R&D capabilities within narrowly defined industries. Conditional on 
data availability, such an approach could be readily applied by other researchers to 
examine similar issues within various industry contexts.  
 
2.2. Literature review 
2.2.1. Complements or substitutes? 
Firms must continuously invest in the development of new products in order to 
stay competitive. Sources of innovative knowledge are no longer limited to internal 
investments, but they include more significant contributions from external sources, such 
as licensing. The importance of technology licensing has long been recognized in the 
literature on industrial organization. However, past research on markets for technology 
has mostly focused on the supply-side drivers of licensing decisions (Arora and 
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora et al., 2001; Katz and Shapiro, 1987). 
Less attention has been paid to the incentive to buy technology in the market, particularly 
on the relationship between internal and external R&D (Arora and Gambardella, 2010). 
This is an important gap in the literature, because technology buyers in most high-tech 
industries conduct extensive internal R&D, which could alter their external investment 




internally and obtaining it externally. This tension raises the question of whether internal 
and external R&D investments are complements or substitutes. While a few studies have 
recently attempted to address this question, results to date are not conclusive.  
Several empirical studies support the substitution viewpoint. Pisano’s (1990) 
findings suggest that substitution is driven by transaction costs and their influence on the 
decision to externally expand R&D. Laursen and Salter (2006) find that internal R&D 
investments negatively moderate the relationship between external knowledge (licensing) 
and innovation performance. In a study on investments in advanced Internet technologies, 
Forman et al. (2008) find a substitute relationship between internal firm resources (e.g., 
programmers) and external technologies. In a model of technology adoption, they find 
that the marginal contribution of internal firm resources tends to diminish within large 
urban areas. It is therefore possible that the external resources available in cities are 
partial substitutes for both establishment-level and firm-level internal resources.  
Complementarity between internal and external R&D, on the other hand, implies 
that these two forms of R&D coexist and are interdependent. Unlike the substitute 
relationship, complementarity implies that firms acquiring external technologies must 
also continue to engage in internal R&D. Several studies provide evidence in support of 
complementarity (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Lowe and Taylor, 1998; Png, 2012; 
Tsai and Wang, 2008). Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), for example, provide empirical 
evidence in support of complementarity between internal R&D and external technology 
acquisition strategies (these include licensing, alliances, and acquisitions). The study of 
Tsai and Wang (2008) on Taiwanese electronics manufacturing demonstrates that 




show that external acquisition of technology has a positive effect on performance when 
interacting with internal R&D.  
Other empirical evidence, consistent with complementarity, suggests that external 
know-how can quickly bring new resources to a firm during different stages of 
production. New knowledge, such as externally generated patents or partially developed 
compounds, can boost the development process and potentially increase expected 
revenues. Along these lines, Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find that internal knowledge 
is combined with technology acquisition to fill research pipeline gaps. Danzon et al. 
(2007) argue that firms acquire technology in order to replenish pipeline gaps and 
respond to excess capacity generated by patent expirations. Similarly, Chan et al. (2007) 
find that firms engage in the external technology market as a result of downstream 
cospecialized complementary assets.  
In contrast, Vega-Jurado et al. (2009) find no evidence of complementarity nor 
substitution in the Spanish manufacturing sector. These authors analyze the effect of 
external knowledge sourcing strategies on the development of both product and process 
innovation for a sample of innovative Spanish firms. Their results suggest that firms rely 
on both internal R&D and external knowledge sources, but that the two activities do not 
have synergistic effects. 
In sum, previous research demonstrates the importance of effective internal R&D 
and external technology acquisition strategies for superior economic performance. 
However, there is mixed evidence and limited understanding concerning the relationship 
between these two types of activities, especially their conditioning drivers. Moreover, the 




data allows—at best—only analysis of discrete choices of technology that a firm could 
“make” or “buy” at a specific point in time.  
 
2.2.2. Drivers of complementarity 
Our literature review suggests that the firm-level drivers of the degree of 
complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and in-licensing can be 
grouped into factors determining a firm’s absorptive capacity, economies of scope, and 
licensing experience. 
 
2.2.2.1. Absorptive Capacity 
Absorptive capacity reflects a firm’s ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit 
knowledge from the environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Arora and Gambardella 
(1994b) formally link this concept to a firm’s external technology acquisition strategy. 
They emphasize two components of absorptive capacity that are relevant to the 
acquisition of external technology through alliances. One component is the ability to 
evaluate external technology, which depends on a firm’s upstream research capability. 
Another component is a firm’s ability to utilize external technologies, which depends on 
its technological and development skills.  
We build on Arora and Gambardella’s contribution by suggesting that both types 
of firm capabilities tend to be associated with a stronger complementarity between 
internal and external R&D activities. On one hand, an increase in the cumulated 
investment in internal R&D, especially when the type of R&D is more basic in nature, 




as it enhances the selection of external technology projects. On the other hand, higher 
levels of internal R&D, especially when R&D is more geared toward design or 
development of new products increases the returns from external technology investments 
by facilitating the effective integration of external technology within the buyer’s value 
chain. We will exploit this distinction between the ability to evaluate and utilize external 
technology in our empirical setting in order to guide our empirical measurement and 
analysis. 
    
2.2.2.2. Economies of scope 
A second set of drivers of complementarity between internal R&D and in-
licensing relate to the concept of economies of scope, defined as the cost savings that are 
generated from adopting different activities in multiple markets (Fosfuri and Rønde, 
2009; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996).  The advantage gained through exploitation of 
economies of scope arises from sharing or jointly utilizing production inputs such as 
technological resources. When technologies are licensed for use in one market, they can 
freely or at reduced additional cost be re-adopted to other markets or products. Therefore, 
the opportunity to share technologies across different projects facilitate the generation of 
synergies among them by creating links between resources that would otherwise remain 
separate. While the logic of economies of scope typically refers to the benefits of related 
diversification in terms of cost advantages, these benefits can also be formulated in terms 
of products and services. The external knowledge developed for a given technological 
area may potentially be beneficial to the development of products in other technological 




Winter, 2002), the external knowledge acquired for a specific project can be utilized to 
improve the current development of products in other technological areas.  
Following this logic, we expect that firms with broader experience across 
different technological areas to be characterized by a stronger degree of complementarity 
between internal R&D and in-licensing. This implies that such firms may be using 
knowledge developed in different fields additively in the innovative process (Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1996). Complementarities may arise if technologies purchased from 
external sources have different technical specifications, and thus are useful to fulfill 
internal capability gaps. In such cases, economies of scope should increase the synergetic 
combination of internal and external inputs.  
 
2.2.2.3. Licensing Experience 
The logic underlying the effect of prior licensing experience on the 
complementarity between internal and external R&D is similar, in many respects, to the 
concept of absorptive capacity examined above. Licensing experience refers to the 
cumulative experience in leveraging external knowledge, whereas absorptive capacity is 
based on the cumulative experience developed by investing in internal knowledge. Under 
this view, collaborative agreements, such as licensing, joint ventures, and acquisitions, 
may enhance a firm’s ability to more effectively combine internal and external 
technologies.  
The literature suggests that firms with prior licensing experience are more likely 
to have developed effective communication mechanisms, more flexible organizational 




of external technologies within existing R&D structures (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002).  Indeed, firms vary in the extent to which their organizational 
structure supports the management of technology acquisition. For example, Pfizer has 
recently invested in creating a new division called “the Research Network Initiative,” in 
order to allow external technologies from their various partnerships to become more 
accessible to internal projects.
1
 
Furthermore, similar to the effect of scientific capabilities highlighted in the 
previous section, firms with more extensive licensing experience are better able to 
identify valuable external technologies that best fit their internal R&D efforts, thus 
increasing the synergies between the two activities. 
  
2.3. Model description and estimation procedure 
2.3.1. Step 1: CES-Translog specification and functional form tests 
We assume that each firm is characterized by an innovation production function 
(n), which depends on investments for the acquisition of external technology (Re), 
internal R&D expenditure (Ri), and a constant term that represents firm-specific effects as 
well as other exogenous components affecting the productivity of resources invested in 
innovation (S): 
 
(1)                                 
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Hereafter, the firm and time subscripts are omitted for simplicity. We start by 
adopting a CES-Translog specification, a flexible, functional form that nests the Cobb-
Douglas, CES, and Translog specifications. Previous work using a CES-Translog 
specification include Pollak et al. (1984) and Dewan and Min (1997). The former provide 
estimates of a CES-Translog cost function and find that it fits significantly better multiple 
datasets covering different industries and countries than had been previously used in the 
literature. The latter builds upon Pollak et al. (1984) to directly estimate the CES-
Translog as a production function to analyze the effect of IT and non-IT capital on 
productivity in the IT industry.  
There are two main advantages of using a CES-Translog specification. First, it is 
a flexible, functional form that is compatible with a wider range of substitution 
possibilities than CES or Translog. Second, we can exploit its nested properties to find 
the best functional form that describes the innovative process without losing efficiency in 
terms of likelihood (Pollak et al., 1984) and without imposing a priori restrictions on our 
model. Overall, this methodology helps improve upon existing research, because 
estimating the complementarity relationship between internal and external R&D using 
restrictive production models may cause specification errors and yield biased 
econometric estimates.    
We define our CES-Translog production function as: 
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where Ri and Re represent internal R&D expenditure and in-licensing investment 
(external R&D),         , and u is a random error term representing the unobserved 
drivers of the internal and external R&D investments. Equation (2) shows that it is 
possible to innovate even if a firm does not invest in these two types of R&D, due to the 
effect of an exogenous component, S, which might include factors such as knowledge 
flows from other firms or universities. The additive linear term is equivalent to a classic 
CES specification, where ρ represents the elasticity of substitution between Ri and Re. 
The βs and γ coefficients represent, respectively, the quadratic impact and the cross-effect 
of R&D investments on the production of innovations.
2
  
According to Pollak et al. (1984), researchers can exploit the nested properties of 
the CES-Translog to test for other functional forms, and to reduce model complexity 
without reducing its estimation efficiency. These tests offer more flexibility to researches 
in modeling innovation functions, because they do not require that prior assumptions on 
data behavior be made. The Cobb-Douglas, CES, and Translog forms are all special cases 
of the CES-Translog. When all quadratic terms are equal to zero, we obtain a CES 
function. The Cobb-Douglas is obtained when all quadratic terms are equal to zero and ρ 
tends to zero. The Translog specification can be found when ρ approaches 0 and all the 
other parameters are different from zero. These nested properties enable testing for model 
specification using conventional test procedures (Pollak et al., 1984). Table 2.1 
summarizes these three specification tests. A rejection of all the specification tests 
presented in Table 2.1 would lead to the adoption of the CES-Translog innovation 
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Our definition of the degree of complementarity/substitutability is based on the cross partial derivative of 
the production function. This is different from the elasticity of substitution, which is defined as the 






production function. However, a simpler, but still efficient functional form can be 




Table 2.1. Functional form tests 
Functional form Coefficients test 
Cobb-Douglas ρ = 0; βi = 0; βe = 0; γie = 0 
CES βi = 0; βe = 0; γie = 0 
Translog ρ = 0 




2.3.2. Step 2: Estimation of the degree of complementarity 
After testing the coefficients of the CES-Translog, we are able to choose the most 
efficient functional form specification to be used in our model. Our empirical findings, 
discussed below in Section 2.5.1, will show that the Translog production function better 
fits our data. Therefore, we will only compute and focus on the degree of 
complementarity or substitutability for the Translog production function in the sections 
that follow.  The Translog specification is defined as follows: 
 
(3)      
    
               
            




where S is the exogenous component of the production function, u is the error 
component, and Ri and Re represent internal and external research, respectively. We 
estimate the Translog by taking logarithms of both sides of (3), which allow us to employ 
linear estimation techniques.  
The marginal productivity of internal and external R&D using the Translog 
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We then estimate the degree of complementarity or substitutability using the 
following cross-partial derivative: 
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where  ̃   (        ) and all other variables are as defined above. In contrast 
to the signs for CES and Cobb-Douglas, the sign of 
   
      
 for the Translog functional 
form is less intuitive. Although the values of Ri, Re, and n are positive, the sign of  ̃ is 
ambiguous and we cannot predict ex-ante whether internal and external R&D 




value of n and  ̃ for each firm year by estimating the log-log specification of the 
innovation production function expressed by Equation (3). We then evaluate 
   
      
 for 
representative (mean or median) values of Ri, Re, and the exogenous predictors of n, with 
particular attention to the firm-level drivers of complementarity summarized in Section 
2.2.2.  
       
2.3.3. Empirical strategy 
Our estimation procedure involves two steps. First, we identify whether the 
innovation production function is better represented by a Cobb-Douglas, CES, Translog, 
or CES-Translog by estimating and testing the coefficients of Equation (2). Second, we 
select the best functional form to estimate the degree of complementarity/substitutability. 
We are able to estimate all model parameters regardless of the functional form of the 
production function. Therefore, all the equations are identified. Once the innovation 
production function is estimated, we can compute the sign and magnitude of the cross-
partial derivative 
   
      
 . Notice that    
      
            
 in (3)-(6) represents a 
percentage change in the elasticity of internal R&D for a percentage change in licensing 
or vice versa. While this is a more easily interpretable notion of complementarity, an 
evaluation of the sign of the cross-partial derivative (6) suggests that its sign is not 
determined by the sign of    .    
The production functions presented in the previous sections can be used in the 
context of a profit maximization model with endogenous internal and external R&D 




exclusion restrictions which imply that variables affecting the optimal level of internal 
R&D and licensing (external R&D) do not affect the innovation production function 
other than through Ri and Re. This provides information about instrumental variables that 
can be utilized in order to deal with the endogeneity of internal R&D and licensing. The 
source of endogeneity comes from unobserved factors that may drive both the production 
of innovations as well as the efficiency of internal and external R&D investments. As 
discussed more fully below, we use exogenous drivers of the expected value of an 
innovation as instruments for internal and external R&D investments in the innovation 
production function. We also experiment using controls for unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity to test the sensitivity of the results to our identification strategy.  
 
2.4. Data 
Our sample is based on a unique longitudinal dataset built from a variety of 
sources. We began by creating a comprehensive list of global pharmaceutical firms from 
Pharmaprojects that were active in drug development at any point during 1997–2005. 
Data includes both the timeline of drug development (e.g., the various stages of clinical 
trials, FDA approval, and project discontinuations) and detailed information on the 
potential size of the market and the novelty of the compound.  
Next, we matched our list of firms with Compustat, collecting data on firm sales, 
total R&D expenditures, and the number of firm employees. Licensing information was 
obtained from Deloitte ReCap and includes data on royalties, up-front payments, and 
milestones. Finally, from IMS MIDAS™ we obtained product-level promotion 




statistics are provided in Table 2.2 and correlations are presented in Table 2.3 (both 
provided  in Chapter 2 Appendix). 
Our final sample consists of 94 global pharmaceutical firms active in drug 
development between 1997 and 2005. Of those, 85% of the firms were located in North 
America and 12% were located in Europe and the U.K. The average firm has 
approximately 11 compounds in its pipeline. Our firms, like most major pharmaceutical 
companies, operate in a number of therapeutic areas. In the sample, the average number 
of therapeutic categories per firms is six. Almost one-third of the compounds under 
development are focused in three therapeutic areas: central nervous system, alimentary 




2.4.1. Dependent variables 
Product pipeline. Our dependent variable is the firm-year product pipeline, 
which represents a firm’s innovative output. The importance of studying a firm pipeline 
is based on the idea that compounds are developed in stages, all of which require 
different resources and capabilities in order to reach commercialization. These resources 
can be developed internally or acquired through the markets for technology. Using data 
from Pharmaprojects, we generate a yearly pipeline stock by cumulating the number of 
FDA approved drugs and those being developed for each firm in our sample.
4
 To account 
                                                          
3 
ATC stands for Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical as defined by the World Health Organization 
(http://www.whocc.no/). These therapeutic classes are: A: alimentary tract and metabolism; B, blood and 
blood forming organs; C, cardiovascular system; D, dermatologicals; G, genitourinary system and sex 
hormones; H, systemic hormonal preparations, excl. sex hormones and insulins; J, anti-infectives for 
systemic use; L, antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents; M, musculoskeletal system; N, nervous 
system; P, antiparasitic products, insecticides, and repellents; and R, respiratory system.  
4
 To deal with observations equal to zero (10% of our sample), we compute our pipeline variable as 




for development uncertainty, compounds are weighted by average probabilities of 
successfully reaching FDA approval, conditional on their phase of development 
(Grabowski, 2002). In this way, we provide greater weight to later-stage drug candidates 
(Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). This is consistent with our objective to compare the 
efficiency of internal R&D and in-licensing in obtaining new, marketable products.  
 
2.4.2. Independent variables 
Internal R&D investments. We compute internal R&D investments using data 
from Compustat and Deloitte ReCap. R&D data from Compustat includes expenditures in 
R&D that could be performed internally or externally.
5
 In order to isolate internal R&D, 
we use licensing data from Deloitte Recap and subtract it from the Compustat data. The 
resulting difference is our proxy for purely internal R&D expenditures. Finally, since 
developed knowledge can become obsolete over time, we use a 15% depreciation rate to 
compute an internal R&D stock variable (Hall, 1993). 
In-licensing investment (external R&D). We use Deloitte ReCap data to collect 
licensing payments. Our in-licensing variable is based on the sum of milestones and 
                                                          
5 
In-licensing upfront fees and milestones are expensed when incurred as R&D expenditures (FAS 2R.12). 
The following examples from public filings explain the underlying accounting principles. 1) ABBOTT 
2010 10-K SEC filing (p. 51) states:  
“Internal research and development costs are expensed as incurred. Clinical trial costs incurred by 
third parties are expensed as the contracted work is performed. Where contingent milestone 
payments are due to third parties under research and development arrangements, the milestone 
payment obligations are expensed when the milestone results are achieved.”  
2) BIOMARIN 2010 10-K SEC filings (p. 43) states:  
“Research and development expenses include expenses associated with contract research and 
development provided by third parties.... Amounts due under such arrangements may be either 
fixed fee or fee for service, and may include upfront payments, monthly payments and payments 
upon the completion of milestones or receipt of deliverables.”  
3) MERCK 2010 10-K SEC filings (p. 115) states:  
“Research and development is expensed as incurred. Upfront and milestone payments due to third 
parties in connection with research and development collaborations prior to regulatory approval 






 As with the internal R&D variable, we build the stock of licensing 
investment using a 15% depreciation rate (Hall, 1993). In the case of missing values, we 
imputed the payments based on the average investment for agreements with similar 
characteristics, such as the same year of signing, stage at signing, disease, and type of 
technology.
7
 Because the stock of licensing expenditures also capture a firm’s licensing 
experience, we will also use this variable to evaluate the extent to which such experience 
may affect the degree of complementarity between the internal generation and external 
acquisition of technologies. 
 
2.4.3. Instrumental variables for internal and external R&D 
As noted above, internal R&D (Ri) and in-licensing (Re) are correlated with 
unobserved productivity factors affecting both inputs and output of innovation. Our R&D 
optimization model suggests that variables affecting the expected value of an innovation 
should only affect the production of innovation through these variables’ effects on the 
levels of internal and external R&D investments.
8
 We therefore use variables that should 
affect the profitability of marketed drugs, such as potential size of the market, drug 
novelty, number of competitors, and the strength of a firm’s complementary assets. As 
shown in the empirical results section, the above instruments appear to have sufficient 
                                                          
6 
We are not able to include royalties in our in-licensing measure because they are included in the income 
statement as part of operating expenses or as cost of sales and are not explicitly available in a consistent 
way in either public documents or Deloitte ReCap. Given this limitation, we acknowledge that our in-
licensing measure is downward biased and most likely provides a lower bound of the in-licensing effect on 
innovative output. 
7
 Only 9% of data had missing values for this variable. To check the robustness of our results to the 
imputation method, we re-estimated the model without the imputed values, and the results were unchanged. 
8




power and seem to be uncorrelated with the econometric error term, as indicated by the 
tests for instrument validity.  
First, we use potential product market size as an instrument for internal and 
external R&D investments, because it reflects exogenous drivers of the future demand of 
the firm. In the case of successful approval and commercialization, each firm is able to 
service the potential market and gain the associated revenues. The larger the expected 
size of the market, the higher will be the overall R&D effort (both internal and external 
investments) to develop a final product (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004). Pharmaprojects 
includes estimates of the potential product market size for drugs in development. We 
compute the expected market size for pipeline products by summing the estimated values 
of each firm’s drugs in each year.  
Second, we use drug novelty as another potential instrument. This data is made 
available by Pharmaprojects, which contains independent ratings about the novelty of 
compounds. Each compound’s novelty is categorized using a discrete range between 1 
and 6, where the value 6 represents the most innovative drugs. Consistent with recent 
work, our measure of drug novelty is based on drugs with the highest novelty rank, 
corresponding to “leading compounds” (Ceccagnoli and Jiang, 2012; Jaffe et al., 1993; 
Perelman, 2003).  We then use the proportion of novel drugs in the pipeline for each 
firm-year of each firm as an additional instrumental variable.   
Third, we use the number of competitors to proxy for the incentive to be 
innovative and productive. While the effect on incentives for product innovation is ex-
ante ambiguous, the number of competitors does affect market prices and demand 




at least one product sold in the main therapeutic area (ATC) of the focal company. The 
data was collected from IMS MIDAS
TM
. 
Finally, ownership and strength of downstream complementary assets is an 
important driver of the appropriability of returns from innovation (Teece, 1986). We use 
two variables to proxy for a firm’s strength of complementary assets. First, we employ a 
firm’s detailing expenditures, obtained from IMS MIDAS™, to capture that firm’s 
marketing capability. Detailing is defined as promotion activities directed toward 
physicians and hospitals, journal advertising, and direct-mail. We also use the stock of a 
firm’s trademarks to proxy for that firm’s brand capital (Fosfuri et al., 2008). These two 
instruments are associated with both internal and external R&D investments, since they 
enhance the appropriability of both types of investments. We collect data on active 
trademarks from the USPTO and use them to build a stock variable.  
 
2.4.4. Complementarity drivers and other control variables 
One theoretical argument related to absorptive capacity suggests that the firm’s 
cumulated investment in basic research is complementary to in-licensing. Data pertaining 
to analysis of this argument is typically unavailable using secondary sources. From an 
empirical point of view, a way around this problem is to identify the type of R&D 
conducted by each firm. Indeed, the complementarity between commonly observed 
measures of R&D expenditures (which includes applied research and development 
activities) should increase the more a firm conducts relatively basic research activities. 
Consistent with this idea, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) suggest that the extent to 




complementarity between internal and external innovation strategies. Therefore, as 
measures of a firm’s type of R&D we use the focal firm’s cumulative number of 
scientific publications, according to data provided by the Web of Science. A strong 
scientific publications record indicates that a firm’s technology is based on advances in 
science. As a measure of absorptive capacity, which reflects a firm’s ability to effectively 
integrate external technology, we follow Arora and Gambardella (1994b) and utilize two 
alternative measures: the cumulative number of patents granted each year to the focal 
firm (available from the USPTO) and the cumulative stock of internal  R&D.    
To measure the potential for economies of scope across different scientific fields, 
we use the total number of therapeutic areas covered by the drugs in the pipeline of the 
focal firm each year, which we label, “number of ATCs”. Firms that operate in different 
ATCs may develop capabilities unique to a specific therapeutic area and exploit possible 
economies of scope. Moreover, innovations in the pipeline can often be used in multiple 
therapeutic areas, thereby increasing their application possibilities. For example, 
Topamax
®
 was originally approved as an anti-epileptic but was subsequently used for 
obesity and peripheral pain. 
Among other exogenous variables, we include firm size, which is measured by the 
total number of firm employees (obtained from Compustat) and intended to control for 
size-related factors that might drive differences in innovative performance. To control for 
possible differences in uncertainty between in-licensed and internally developed drugs, 
we include the percentage of licensed compounds (gathered from Pharmaprojects) that a 
firm has at each phase of the clinical development process. Indeed, firms that license new 








Finally, we control for industry, firm, location, and year of unobserved fixed 
effects. To control for technological opportunities and other unobserved factors 
associated with the main technological field of the focal firm, we identify the primary 
ATC as the therapeutic are with the highest level of annual sales, then we include a set of 
dummy variables that would equal one for the main therapeutic area of the focal firm 
(based on the primary ATC) and zero otherwise. Given our definition of primary ATC, 
the ATC dummy variables vary over time. We also include specifications with year 
dummies and controls for firm fixed effects. The latter are included to control for firm 
heterogeneity. In models without firm-fixed effects, we also include 4-digit SIC-code 
dummies and geographic location dummies (North America, Europe, and other). 
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. First step: Functional form tests 
Our estimation procedure starts by estimating the coefficients of a CES-Translog 
production function (Equation 2). The tests are summarized in Table 2.1. The advantage 
of adopting a flexible specification in the first step is due to its nested properties. 
Equation (2) allows us to test whether the production function can be simplified by using 
a Cobb-Douglas, CES, or Translog function. Our regression specification tests are 
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 Pisano (1997) finds evidence of the existence of a market for lemons in the external technology market. If 
true, this would suggest that firms would not achieve any reductions in risk and the expectations for success 
of those products would be less than internally developed molecules. However, Arora et al. (2009)find the 
opposite to be true. They find that compounds licensed during preclinical trials are as likely to succeed as 
internal compounds of the licensor. Danzon et al. (2005) also find that products developed in an alliance 




reported in Table 2.4. In this first set of analyses, we are not interested in the marginal 
effect of our independent variables but rather focus only on the specification tests 
described in Table 2.1. Marginal effects and the degree of complementarity or 
substitutability, if any, are the focus of the second step of our empirical estimation 
procedure, discussed below.  
We report the results for different models in Table 2.4. Model (1) is estimated 
using OLS Fixed Effect. It includes our main variables (internal R&D and licensing 
expenditures) and our full set of controls, including firm fixed-effects. Model (2) is 
estimated using GMM and incorporates the main variables and a full set of controls.
10,11
 
The instrumental variables pass the validity tests, as discussed in Table 2.4. 
Our results, which are robust across the estimated models, indicate that ρ is not 
significantly different from zero. As a result, we can adopt a Translog specification for 
our production function, as defined by Equation (4). Moreover, we clearly reject the 
possible use of both a Cobb-Douglas and CES specification, because the related tests 
specified in Table 2.1 are significant. While ρ is not significantly different from zero, all 
the coefficients on the quadratic terms (βi, βe, and γie, respectively) are jointly different 




                                                          
10
 The nonlinearity of Equation 4 does not allow us to eliminate the firm fixed effects using first-
differences, nor by transforming the data to within-firm deviations. As a result, we control for unobserved 
firm heterogeneity using a set of firm-specific dummy variables.  
11
 The GMM model with all controls (2) and all firm fixed-effects, however, did not converge. Thus, it is 



















2.5.2. Second step: Estimating the degree of complementarity/substitutability using 
the Translog production function.  
After identifying Equation (4) as the appropriate innovation production function, 
we focus on estimating the degree of complementarity and its distribution across key firm 
characteristics. To facilitate estimation and interpretation of the coefficients, we adopt a 
log-log form of the Translog.  This transformation makes the model linear with respect to 
the natural logarithm of our main independent variables. We then estimate the elasticities 
   




Model (2)  
GMM 
Tests Cobb – Douglas 1480.7*** 428.36*** 
 
CES 1478.1*** 339.51*** 
 
Translog 0.45 0.18 
 
Firm Fixed effects Yes No 
 Number of Observations 748 632 
 Over-identification test (p-value)  0.767 
- The table reports Chi-Square statistics, with *** denoting p-value < 0.01, related to the 
Wald test of hypotheses presented in Table 2.1. 
- Both models include the main variables (R&D and Licensing) and the full set of controls. 
Model (1) also includes a full set of firm-specific dummy variables. Model (2) estimated 
with firm fixed-effects did not converge. 
- We use Promotion, Trademarks, their squares, cross product, logs of square terms, and 
cross-product of logs as instruments for internal and external R&D and the related non-
linear terms. Auxiliary first-stage regressions (OLS linear regressions “within” firm) 
suggest that the instruments have power. Indeed, the F-test of the joint effect of the 
instruments on each endogenous variable are 57.97, 5.38, 73.03, 12.57, 7.34 for R&D,  the 
log of R&D-squared, licensing, the log of licensing-squared,  and the cross-product of the 




and the degree of complementarity by taking the derivative with respect to the logarithm 
of internal R&D and in-licensing (external R&D). 
The estimates of the Translog are reported in Table 2.5. We use three different 
estimation methods: a benchmark panel data fixed-effects model with instrumental 
variables estimated with GMM (columns 1-4), a panel random effects model (column 5), 
and a panel fixed effects model (column 6). The magnitude and significance of the cross-
partial derivative 
   
      
 (Equation 6) associated with the models of Table 2.5 (in Chapter 
2 Appendix) are reported in Table 2.6. The cross-partials are evaluated at the mean and 




Table 2.6. Degree of complementarity/substitution. 
 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mean -0.021 -0.031 -0.029 -0.019 -0.0001 0.001 
Standard Error 0.033 0.033 0.024 0.017 0.001 0.001 
 
      
Median -0.02 -0.034 -0.032 -0.012 -0.0001 0.0008 
Standard Error 0.033 0.041 0.031 0.011 0.001 0.0007 
The table presents estimates of the cross-partial derivative 
   
      








Overall, these results suggest that internal R&D and in-licensing expenditures are 
neither complements nor substitutes. In particular, the estimated cross-partials presented 
in Table 2.6 are not significantly different from zero across estimation methods.  
One possible explanation may reside on the specificity of the drug discovery 
process. Pharmaceutical firms rely on external technologies in all development stages, 
and licensed drugs may be used to either substitute an existing stream of research or to 
complement it. In-licensing is one way to access new knowledge, and new knowledge 
boosts innovation. However, in-licensing may have two opposite mechanisms. On one 
hand, external knowledge can fill gaps in internal capabilities. On the other hand, external 
knowledge can complement internal knowledge by integrating the two sources of 
knowledge.  
These results may not be significant because the complementarity effect 
experienced by some firms may be offset by the negative effect experienced by others. It 
follows that studying complementarity without understanding its drivers and the 
distribution across firms’ characteristics may generate misleading results.  
The results presented in Table 2.6 improve upon the existing literature in several 
ways. Our use of in-licensing investments provides more direct evidence on the marginal 
productivity of the financial resources invested in innovation. The extant literature more 
commonly uses a stock of external deals as a measure of external R&D or self-reported 
discrete measures of whether a firm acquires technology in the market. Furthermore, our 
empirical approach offers a new method to estimate complementarity without imposing 




more substantively, our results indicate that internal R&D and in-licensing do not, on 
average, have a significant joint effect on the production of new drugs. 
 
2.5.3. Firm-level drivers of complementarity 
To identify the impact of potential drivers of complementarity, we first present a 
graphical analysis of the cross partial derivative 
   
      
 (Equation 6) obtained using our 
benchmark GMM instrumental variable method with fixed effects. The objective of this 
analysis is to understand whether firms that perform better than others across the four 
different drivers experience a different level of complementarity among the two types of 
investments. Figure 2.1 (in Chapter 2 Appendix) reports the values of the degree of 
complementarity captured by the cross-partial over the range of our measures of 
absorptive capacity (scientific publications, stock of internal R&D, patents), economies 
of scope (number of therapeutic categories, or ATC), and licensing experience (stock of 
in-licensing investments). 
In all of the five graphs, the sign and magnitude of the joint effect vary with 
changes in the levels of the drivers. Overall, 
   
      
 exhibits a positive trend in all cases, 
thus confirming that a higher level of complementarity is associated with higher levels of 
drivers. These findings confirm the complexity of the relationship between internal and 
external R&D investments; they also suggest that most previous studies on 
complementarity have not been able to ascertain whether a more composite relationship 




whether two activities are either complementary or substitute may be non-informative, 
since the joint effect changes across different ranges of value of key firm characteristics.  
 As a robustness measure, we present estimates in Table 2.7 (in Chapter 2 
Appendix) of the Translog production function (Equation 4) using our benchmark GMM 
method with firm-fixed effects within sub-samples of firms characterized by either low 
(bottom 25%) or high (top 25%) levels of the distribution of the examined driver.  
For an analysis of the significance of the differences across groups, we present 
tests for mean complementarity differences across groups of firms defined using bottom 
and top quartiles of the distributions of the examined drivers for both full and split-
sample estimations. The resulting difference’s positive value implies a higher degree of 
complementarity for the group of firms above the top quartile. These tests are shown in 
Table 2.8 (in Chapter 2 Appendix).    
Overall, our results confirm our expectations. We find that firms with highly 
cumulative levels of scientific publications, internal R&D, or patents are characterized, 
on average, by a higher level of the cross-partial derivative capturing the degree of 
complementarity. The results confirm that firms with broader experiences across 
therapeutic areas are characterized, on average, by a stronger complementarity 
relationship between internal R&D and in-licensing. This finding suggests that these 
firms may be using knowledge developed in different fields additively in the innovative 
process, which would support Henderson and Cockburn (1996) view. Finally, results 
indicate that complementarity increases for firms that have a larger stock of prior 




agreement formation facilitate the management and integration of external technologies 
(Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010).  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Our goal has been to offer a deeper understanding of the exact nature of the 
relationship between internal R&D and in-licensing (external R&D). While the extant 
literature remains unclear about the relationship between these two strategies, our 
primary focus is to understand how the joint effect of two activities varies across several 
different drivers. Excluding the research by Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), there is a 
lack of empirical work examining the conditions under which internal R&D and in-
licensing are either complements or substitutes. 
We analyze possible determinants of this relationship by splitting our sample 
based on five potential drivers. Our mean tests confirm that complementarity appears to 
increase when associated with higher levels of the selected drivers. In other words, firms 
with higher absorptive capacity, those with alliance experience, and those that enjoy 
economies-of-scope are characterized by stronger complementarity. These results are 
confirmed by our graphical analysis and tests of hypotheses, which support a positive 
relation between complementarity and drivers. Existing theories offer theoretical support 
of our results and provide insights for further theoretical work on the complementarity 
between innovative activities. At the same time, we provide a methodological 
contribution, since our framework can be used for a more rigorous understanding of the 
industry and firm characteristics that affect the relationship between internal and external 




One limitation of this research comes from the fact that we only analyze one 
dimension of innovative performance, the introduction of new drugs.  In line with the 
contribution of  Arora and Gambardella (1994b), for example, one could claim that 
absorptive capacity, in particular a firm’s scientific capability, will allow the technology 
buyer to be more discerning in the external technology that they select and will have a 
higher threshold value for each external R&D project. In other words, the mix of internal 
and external R&D may affect the expected value of an innovation, which we do not 
observe. To the extent that we are neglecting a potentially positive effect of the mix of 
internal and external R&D on the profitability of new drugs, our analysis can be 
considered as providing estimates of complementarity that are downward biased. This 
may contribute to explain why on average we do not find complementarity. In order to 
more fully analyze the marginal returns from internal and external R&D we would need 
data on the profitability associated with each drug, a task we leave for future work.    
A second limitation of our study relates to our industry setting and the 
generalization of our results to other industries, since innovation factors are often 
determined by industrial dynamics. The R&D process in the pharmaceutical industry is 
characterized by long development cycles, high costs, and significant levels of 
uncertainty, which may affect the extent to which a firm relies on different innovative 
strategies. Industries that present a different innovative process might experience a 
different relationship. Although our results are not generalizable, our methodology can be 
replicated in different industry settings. 
A third limitation lies in the definition and treatment of uncertainty associated 




possibility of success correlated to internally developed or externally acquired 
compounds. For example, Guedj (2005) shows that alliance projects are 21% more likely 
to move from Phase I to Phase II, while co-developed compounds are less successful in 
later stages (Phase II, Phase III, and FDA approval) than internal projects. Conversely, 
Arora et al. (2009) suggest that asymmetric information and market imperfections 
increase costs, and the expected value of the licensed compound increases as a result. 
They show that the probability of success for a licensed compound is higher than for an 
internally developed one. We attempt to deal with the uncertainty related to in-licensing 
investments by controlling for the percentage of in-licensed compounds in each phase. 
We also weight the firm’s research pipeline by the average probability of success 
associated with each development stage to account for process development uncertainty. 
Finally, while our results help us to understand the relation among innovative 
factors, we do not directly test whether there might be an optimal balance between R&D 
strategies, as suggested by other scholars. For example, Rothaermel et al. (2006) suggest 
that by performing some activities of the value chain internally and some externally, a 
firm is able to exploit external technology and adopt a flexible strategy to introduce new 
products. Knowing whether internal development and in-licensing are complements or 
substitutes might help build a feasible equilibrium between these two strategies. This 
would allow for a more complete understanding of the proposed outsourcing move by 
companies such as GlaxoSmithKline (Knowles and Higgins, 2011). Ultimately, this 
knowledge also allows for a deeper understanding of the feasibility of more radical views 
of the innovative process, such as the search and development model proposed by 




CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX 
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Product pipeline 1.764 1.184 0 5.029 
In-Licensing (deflated, Mil. $) 239.443 633.850 0 5184.333 
Internal R&D (deflated, Mil. $) 1345.112 3195.205 0.473 28756.440 
Detailing stock (deflated, Thousands $) 7042.601 19559.700 0 173521.400 
Trademark stock 11.590 34.003 0 426 
Expected market size (deflated, Thousands $) 2158.068 1556.527 0 10217.840 
Competitors 1308.882 578.575 201 2626 
Drug novelty 0.154 0.185 0 1 
Sales (deflated, Mil. $) 4510.527 10029.110 0 67674.560 
Firm size (hundreds) 13.841 26.717 0.001 122 
Scientific References 3.689 3.785 0 36 
North America 0.849 0.359 0 1 
Europe 0.116 0.320 0 1 
Other 0.035 0.184 0 1 
Number of ATCs 6.781 5.782 1 16 
% licensed compound (Phase 1) 0.029 0.076 0 1 
% licensed compound (Phase 2) 0.055 0.129 0 1 
% licensed compound (Phase 3) 0.056 0.139 0 1 
Main therapeutic areas 
    ATC A 0.112 0.316 0 1 
    ATC B 0.023 0.151 0 1 
    ATC C 0.095 0.294 0 1 
    ATC D 0.066 0.249 0 1 
    ATC G 0.050 0.217 0 1 
    ATC H 0.005 0.072 0 1 
    ATC J 0.102 0.302 0 1 
    ATC K 0.009 0.095 0 1 
    ATC L 0.043 0.203 0 1 
    ATC M 0.031 0.174 0 1 
    ATC N 0.145 0.352 0 1 
    ATC P 0.001 0.036 0 1 
    ATC R 0.061 0.240 0 1 
    ATC S 0.030 0.171 0 1 
    ATC T 0.009 0.095 0 1 
    ATC V 0.013 0.114 0 1 
N=767 




Table 2.3. Correlation Table
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Product pipeline 1 
              2. In-Licensing (deflated, Mil. $) 0.492 1 
             3. Internal R&D (deflated, Mil. $) 0.629 0.733 1 
            4. Detailing stock (deflated, Thousands $) 0.642 0.783 0.937 1 
           5. Trademark stock 0.338 0.549 0.668 0.597 1 
          6. Expected market size (deflated, Thousands $) 0.109 0.090 0.156 0.110 0.096 1 
         7. Competitors 0.054 0.163 0.167 0.169 0.092 0.179 1 
        8. Drug novelty -0.069 0.039 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.264 -0.049 1 
       9. Sales (deflated, Mil. $) 0.543 0.453 0.738 0.622 0.493 0.249 0.166 -0.045 1 
      10. Firm size (hundreds) 0.640 0.493 0.809 0.680 0.542 0.244 0.142 -0.036 0.902 1 
     11. Scientific References 0.301 0.217 0.239 0.214 0.177 -0.041 -0.020 -0.044 0.177 0.251 1 
    12. Number of ATCs 0.649 0.398 0.499 0.513 0.322 0.195 0.177 -0.135 0.580 0.638 0.218 1 
   13. % licensed compound (Phase 1) 0.157 0.137 0.129 0.103 0.121 0.162 0.154 0.004 0.085 0.119 0.084 0.100 1 
  14. % licensed compound (Phase 2) 0.072 0.086 0.097 0.068 0.049 -0.010 0.127 0.049 0.100 0.115 0.007 0.103 0.023 1 




Table 2.5. Panel Regressions. Dependent Variable: log(1+Pipeline). 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. While we use the notation 
“log” we are utilizing the natural log. We use the natural logs of Promotion, Trademarks, Potential product 
market size, Drug novelty, Number of competitors, their logs of square terms, and cross-product of logs as 
instruments for internal and external R&D and the related non-linear terms. Auxiliary first-stage 
regressions (OLS linear regressions “within” firm) suggest that the instruments have power. Indeed, the F-
test of the joint effect of the instruments on each endogenous variable are 3.44, 5.05, 1.57, 16.55, 6.85 
for R&D,  the log of R&D-squared, licensing, the log of licensing-squared,  and the cross-product of the 
logs of R&D and licensing, respectively. 
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 (0.781) (0.671) (0.438) (0.343) (0.0738) (0.0722) 
Log(Licensing) -0.355 -0.143 -0.203 -0.169 0.0436 0.00750 
 (0.306) (0.345) (0.257) (0.180) (0.0452) (0.0427) 
(Log R&D)
2
 -0.136 -0.0822 -0.0696 0.0118 0.00357 -0.00945 












 (0.127) (0.141) (0.109) (0.0687) (0.00588) (0.00607) 
Log(R&D)* Log(Licensing) -0.0715 -0.228 -0.221
*
 -0.150 -0.00110 0.0103 
 (0.126) (0.162) (0.122) (0.0931) (0.00935) (0.00846) 
Publications  -0.0853 -0.0428 0.0251 0.0182 -0.0157 
  (0.204) (0.140) (0.0923) (0.0289) (0.0291) 





  (0.876) (0.786) (0.569) (0.220) (0.229) 
% compound licensed–Phase II  -0.137 -0.0646 0.335 0.147 0.212 
  (0.609) (0.534) (0.307) (0.152) (0.146) 









  (0.617) (0.378) (0.301) (0.148) (0.144) 




 0.0160 -0.0007 -0.001 
  (0.0323) (0.0244) (0.0144) (0.002) (0.002) 
North America     0.453  
     (0.290)  
Europe     1.162
***
  
     (0.357)  
Number of ATC     0.067
***
  
     (0.017)  
Firm Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
ATC dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 623 623 623 623 767 767 
Log-Likelihood -556.2 -693.7 -676.6 -470.7  -106.3 
Cluster 73 73 73 73 92 92 




Table 2.7. GMM fixed-effects regressions on split samples based on absorptive capacity 
levels. Dependent variable: log(1+pipeline). 
- Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.  
- While we use the notation “log” we are utilizing the natural log. 
 
  
















Log R&D 0.299 1.245
***
 -1.045 4.500 0.448 -0.804 
 (0.556) (0.402) (0.847) (5.962) (0.355) (1.055) 
Log Licensing -0.0509 -0.740
**
 -0.0586 -0.260 -1.092
**
 0.728 





 0.0978 -0.353 -0.0205 0.0590 
 (0.0613) (0.0417) (0.0956) (0.463) (0.0553) (0.130) 
(Log Licensing)
2
 0.0683 -0.0394 -0.142 -0.0761 0.348
***
 -0.0657 
 (0.0780) (0.0518) (0.165) (0.0761) (0.0840) (0.0655) 
(Log R&D)* (Log Licensing) -0.00359 0.155 0.242 0.178 -0.272
***
 0.0325 





 0.151 0.112 
 (0.159) (0.272) (0.180) (0.0543) (0.172) (0.305) 









 (0.0944) (0.360) (0.143) (0.815) (0.129) (0.804) 















 (0.159) (0.342) (0.176) (0.386) (0.522) (0.492) 










 0.0621 -0.904 
 (0.328) (0.456) (0.371) (0.477) (0.457) (0.654) 
Firm Size -0.0289 -
0.0000161 
-0.202 0.0120 0.00452 -0.00446 
 (0.228) (0.00309) (0.193) (0.00843) (0.0305) (0.00336) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 93 124 100 124 104 121 
Log-Likelihood -23.80 17.64 -9.087 3.005 -50.59 9.551 
Cluster 19 19 29 20 25 20 
Over-identification test (p-
value) 




Table 2.7. GMM fixed-effects regressions on split samples based on economies of scope 
and licensing experience levels. Dependent variable: ln(1+pipeline) - Continued 
- Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.  
- While we use the notation “log” we are utilizing the natural log. 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Bottom 25% 
Number of 
ATCs 






Log R&D 0.309 0.554
**
 0.705 0.113 
 (0.508) (0.246) (1.440) (0.492) 
Log Licensing 0.956 -0.328
*
 1.311 -1.473 







 -0.182 -0.143 
 (0.0921) (0.0403) (0.232) (0.0936) 
(Log Licensing)
2
 0.159 -0.0474 -0.282 0.0322 
 (0.114) (0.0340) (0.204) (0.298) 












 -0.421 -0.0794 
 (0.187) (0.0550) (0.437) (0.195) 
% compound licensed–Phase I 2.014
***
 0.842 1.072 -0.671 
 (0.756) (0.652) (1.251) (0.978) 




 -0.750 0.0285 
 (0.357) (0.393) (0.888) (0.291) 




 -0.642 -1.062 -0.415
**
 
 (0.205) (0.468) (0.928) (0.179) 
Firm Size 0.232
**
 0.00349 0.00940 0.0281 
 (0.0970) (0.00231) (0.00858) (0.203) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 176 159 111 112 
Log-Likelihood -65.55 7.785 -4.450 10.30 
Cluster 25 20 24 26 
Over-identification test 
(p-value) 




Table 2.8. Tests on mean complementarity (
   
      
) differences by group of firms. 
  









partial Standard Error 
Publications 
<= 25% -0.102 0.029 -0.00004 0.0002 
> 75% -0.019 0.001 0.007 0.003 
Difference 0.082**  0.007**  
 
 
    
Internal R&D 
<= 25% -0.165 0.039 -0.039 0.005 
> 75% -0.018 0.001 0.012 0.007 
Difference 0.146***  0.052***  
      
Patents 
<= 25% -0.063 0.026 -0.032 0.026 
> 75% -0.017 0.0006 0.059 0.004 
Difference 0.046**  0.092***  
      
Number of ATC 
<= 25% -0.093 0.02 -0.317 0.045 
> 75% -0.045 0.008 0.0012 0.0002 
Difference 0.047**  0.318***  
 
 
    
Licensing experience 
<= 25% -0.218 0.039 -0.077 0.016 
> 75% -0.016 0.0005 0.019 0.002 
Difference 0.202***  0.09***  
- The table contains estimates of the cross-partial 
   
      
 obtained using the GMM estimates from tables 6 
and 7. 
- The table shows one tail tests. 
- ***, **, * indicate that the difference is < 0 at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 confidence levels, respectively. 
- A positive mean difference suggests that firms above the top quartile of the distribution of the examined 

































































































































INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION AND THE 




The mechanism behind the combination of internal and external knowledge is still 
an open and interesting topic in the strategy literature. Prior work has focused on 
understanding how firms integrate internal and external knowledge and how they benefit 
from their adoption (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Katz 
and Allen, 1982), while a different stream has emphasized the importance of structural 
organization and resource distribution in the case of acquisitions (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001). Surprisingly, there is still little integration between these streams. In particular, 
there is a lack of attention on organizational behavior and characteristics that may 
facilitate or limit the adoption of external technologies.  
For instance, the existing literature has highlighted the benefits of external 
technology acquisition for a firm’s innovative output (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Ceccagnoli et al., 2011), but there is little understanding 
on (1) how the exploitation of internal knowledge affects the adoption of the acquired 
technologies and (2) how the effect of organizational characteristics moderates this 
relationship. Specifically, companies may extensively rely on their internal knowledge 
and capabilities, thereby isolating themselves from external ideas. This attitude has been 
defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) as inward-looking behavior. Under these 




knowledge that may be considered superior. As a consequence, employees, working 
teams and communities may respond to this comparison with resistance and bias toward 
external knowledge. This attitude may lead to the Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome 
(Clagett, 1967; Katz and Allen, 1982), which refers to the negative bias toward 
knowledge developed outside the focal institution. Innovation and strategy literature has 
greatly overlooked this phenomena, while practitioner papers have identified this trade-
off as an important factor in the conversion from closed to open forms of organization 
(Chesbrough, 2006). For example, Huston and Sakkab (2006) report the following about 
P&G’s transition from the classic R&D model to the innovative Connect and Develop 
model: 
 
“We needed to move the company’s attitude from resistance to 
innovations “not invented here” to enthusiasm for those “proudly found 
elsewhere”. And we needed to change how we defined, and perceived, our 
R&D organization – from 7500 people inside to 7500 plus 1.5 million 
outside, with a permeable boundary between them.” (p.61) 
 
In addition to analyzing the negative bias toward external technologies, this paper 
aims to identify two potential moderating factors: the level of absorptive capacity and the 
level of organizational decentralization. The former represents the knowledge base of the 
company and it plays an important role in the selection of external knowledge; it has also 
been linked to higher benefits associated with technology ambidexterity, and it functions 




Alexandre, 2009). The latter refers to the decision to adopt a centralized or decentralized 
R&D organizational structure. Centralized firms may create a competitive environment 
between internal and external knowledge because the decision to acquire external 
knowledge is made directly by the headquarters of the company. This competitive 
environment may favor a contraposition between internal and external knowledge, thus 
supporting the rise of inward-looking behavior.  
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, it fills a gap in the literature on 
firm boundaries and knowledge management. It analyzes the possibility of internal 
knowledge substituting for external technologies. This negative effect can be associated 
with the inward-looking behavior of the firm and the NIH syndrome. As argued by Katz 
and Allen (1982), inward-oriented organizations may perceive external knowledge as 
inferior or as a potential threat when compared to internal knowledge. It is important to 
understand the extent to which such organizations are more likely to reject the adoption 
of external technologies. Second, this study emphasizes the role played by two contingent 
factors in mitigating the negative bias toward external knowledge. I suggest a 2X2 matrix 
that classifies firms based on their level of absorptive capacity and their organizational 
structure (centralized vs. decentralized). 
My findings expand existing literature and prior results. I find that the joint effect 
of internal knowledge and licensing acquisition is negative, which suggests that the two 
sources of knowledge are substitute and supports the logic behind the inward-looking 
behavior argument. Firms that primarily exploit their internal knowledge develop a 
negative attitude toward external technologies. The central argument is that firms are 




specialization in the use of internal knowledge increases the cost of adopting knowledge 
developed outside the firm’s boundaries; when the integration cost is too high, the 
adoption of external knowledge is reduced. I also find support that organizational 
structure and absorptive capacity affect and mitigate inward-looking behavior. Results 
suggest that firms can reduce negative bias and benefit from an open strategy through a 
high level of absorptive capacity and the adoption of a decentralized structure.  
 
3.2. Theory and hypotheses 
This paper draws upon several existing streams of literature that have explored the 
decisions and benefits associated with external knowledge and its integration within the 
company. The first stream refers to the literature regarding firms’ boundaries. This stream 
of research suggests that innovative firms should exploit external knowledge to increase 
their performance, but it assumes that acquired technologies are integrated in the 
organization and firms are able to benefit from them. This assumption may be restrictive, 
since existing values and routines may limit the adoption of external technologies. To 
address this gap on technology adoption, I rely on a second stream of research, regarding 
internal organization. External technology adoption can be influenced by several 
organizational factors such as communication channels, routines and individual 
incentives. I focus on the negative bias that firms may have toward external technologies 
because they adopt an inward-looking behavior. It is possible that firms are not able to 
successfully exploit the acquired knowledge because of their negative attitude resulting 
from phenomena such as in-group favoritism and the NIH syndrome which, as previously 




possesses a monopoly in its knowledge field (Katz and Allen, 1982). Finally, I exploit 
research on decentralization and innovation to define two organizational factors that 
mitigate the inward-looking behavior of the company. 
Existing literature has mainly applied two different theories to describe and 
predict a firm's boundary: the capability-based view and the transaction cost theory. The 
former proposes that a firm’s choice is driven by the level of complementary, internal 
capabilities and external knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1993), while the latter advocates 
that the boundary choice is based on the comparison of the costs sustained to develop the 
knowledge either internally or externally (Williamson, 1975).  
Transaction cost economics suggests that two issues are relevant in determining a 
firm’s boundary: the cost of governance and the threat of opportunism. In general, lower 
transaction costs favor the adoption of a market governance rather than a hierarchical 
one. However, firms should also consider the threat of opportunism in an exchange, due 
to transaction-specific investments. Opportunism arises when a party involved in the 
transaction is able to gain an advantage over the other party. According to the transaction 
cost logic, firms that need to access new capabilities should choose between 
internalization and market acquisition based on the level of transaction-specific 
investment. If these investments are high, then internal development should be favored as 
a form of governance.  
However, transaction cost theory has a limitation: it assumes a substitute 
relationship between knowledge sources, despite recent evidence that has demonstrated 
the importance of managing both the “make” and “buy” decisions simultaneously 




capabilities with external knowledge through licensing, outsourcing and acquisition 
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998). In such a dynamic 
environment, corporations are forced to adapt and shape their boundaries both by 
developing new technologies internally and by acquiring them from external sources.  
Recent studies suggest that companies should develop skills in both internal 
development and external sourcing to develop dynamic capabilities and survive over 
time. For example, Agarwal and Helfat (2009) point out that firms are required to 
successfully undertake both internal and external knowledge development to successfully 
implement strategic renewal. Under this view, acquisitions, alliances and licensing 
agreements help reduce the obsolescence of existing capabilities and encourage the 
acquisition of knowledge to fill existing internal knowledge gaps (Capron and Mitchell, 
2009; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Evidence also demonstrates that firms can benefit 
from technology acquisition by increasing the size of their acquired knowledge base 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001) or exploiting information about a target’s innovative activity 
prior to the acquisition (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). Finally, firms can effectively 
adopt external sourcing modes to build new capabilities and boost their performance 
through concurrent sourcing, defined as the simultaneous choice of making and buying 
(Parmigiani, 2007). 
Firms that engage in both internal production and external acquisition of 
knowledge may experience synergies between different knowledge sources. 
Complementarity between internal and external innovative efforts suggests that different 
sources of knowledge modes are mutually dependent. In other words, this implies that 




complementarity emerges, firms that acquire external knowledge must also continue to 
engage in internal R&D to remain competitive (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; Chesbrough, 
2003). It is widely accepted that complementarity influences a firm’s propensity to access 
external knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994a; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006) 
through several modes such as licensing, alliances and acquisitions (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998).  
One limit of this stream of research is the assumption that organizations are able 
to internalize the acquired knowledge and benefit from it. However, it may be possible 
that internal-organization factors reduce the adoption of external knowledge. I aim to fill 
this gap by integrating the literature on firms’ boundaries with research on internal 
organization. More precisely, I focus on the role of internal knowledge as a potential 
mechanism that affects the adoption of external knowledge.  
The combination of internal knowledge and external technologies has been linked 
to a lower innovative performance. Hoang and Rothaermel (2010) and Rothaermel and 
Alexandre (2009) support the idea that firms face a trade-off between internal and 
external technology sources. The former research suggests that, in the context of 
biotechnology firms when companies combine internal technology exploitation with 
external exploration, the negative effect on the performance of R&D projects is higher. 
The latter paper, offering a similar perspective, empirically shows that the relation 
between different technology sources is nonlinear; it follows an inverted-U-shaped 
distribution. A similar nonlinear relation was empirically tested by Laursen and Salter 
(2006) with a sample from the U.K. innovation survey that includes all main sectors of 




external sources. Indeed, the lack of an open strategy may lead them to excessively rely 
on internal knowledge and to underemphasize external knowledge, thus reducing the 
ability to exploit innovative opportunities. The opposite behavior can be detrimental as 
well; firms may focus more on their search for external technologies than the 
development of internal capabilities. As a consequence, the innovative performance may 
be hindered because of the effect of over-searching (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). 
These results suggest the possibility of a trade-off between internal and external 
knowledge sources. Although theoretically possible, it is unlikely that firms specialize 
exclusively in either internal or external technologies because most firms, across several 
industries, have increasingly adopted an open-innovation approach (Chesbrough, 2003, 
2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006). However, this approach does not exclude the possibility 
that firms need to reshape and adapt their organizations to successfully balance internal 
and external technologies.  
One challenge that might arise from the reorganizational process is the tension 
between internal and acquired knowledge. In fact, if internal knowledge is considered 
superior, companies can reject new ideas and, consequently, reduce their performance. 
While some overlap of knowledge within the company favors information sharing and is 
necessary for internal communication, there are benefits associated with having a 
diversity of knowledge sources. This idea is in line with the definition of inward-looking 
behavior introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). The authors suggest that the concept 
of absorptive capacity can be divided into two different components: the outward-looking 
and the inward-looking absorptive capacities. The former refers to the excessive reliance 




capabilities. This concept is consistent with the effect of over-searching described by 
Katila and Ahuja (2002) and Laursen and Salter (2006). The latter component reflects the 
specialization in internal knowledge and the potential rejection of external sources. Firms 
may underestimate the importance of external knowledge because they overemphasize 
the role of internal technologies. This behavior facilitates the formation of routines and 
communication mechanisms, but it introduces a negative bias toward external knowledge. 
In particular, the negative effect can be linked to the disruptive role that external sources 
may have on existing internal mechanisms and routines. Under these conditions, firms 
may implement an inward-oriented knowledge accumulation (IOKA) process that 
extensively relies on internal knowledge: this process exploits the cumulated knowledge 
of the firm, and it is based on routines, norms, and lower costs of access that may induce 
firms to discount acquired technologies. 
It follows that an inward-oriented process may be detrimental for the company. 
For example, the assimilation of external knowledge requires companies to accept and to 
adapt existing capabilities, but inward-looking behavior can negatively influence this 
process. Indeed, if internal knowledge becomes very specialized, it impedes the 
assimilation of outside knowledge; as a result, the inward-looking attitude may generate 
the NIH syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982). As a consequence, those companies afflicted 
would be more likely to substitute internal technologies for external knowledge sources. 
Most prior work has referred to the NIH syndrome as a theoretical concept and 
has emphasized the negative effects associated with it. A pioneering contribution to the 
analysis of the NIH syndrome is represented by the work of Clagett (1967). He analyzed 




by the R&D unit. Two factors were identified as antecedents of the NIH syndrome: 
violation of the norms and routines of the organizational unit, and resistance to changes 
in a familiar environment. Both factors generate a negative attitude toward knowledge 
and reduce the adoption of external technologies. After surveying several R&D 
professionals in 50 project groups, Katz and Allen (1982) found similar results to those of 
Clagett (1967). The NIH syndrome is generated by the insecurity and environmental 
instability created by external technology. In particular, new knowledge affects and 
changes existing routines and roles, creating instability. As a result, project performance 
diminishes when teams operate in a stable collaborative environment for more than five 
years.  
Knowledge creation is a complex process involving individuals, beliefs and 
information. The combination of these factors creates an internal system of routines that 
supports process information and problem solving (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These 
routines are often tacit and developed over time, making them difficult to imitate and 
transform (Teece et al., 1997). External knowledge can threaten the existing internal 
status quo among an organization’s community. If individuals feel that their contribution 
to the knowledge-generating process is being threatened, then they may slow the 
adoption of new technologies and treat external knowledge with hostility. 
The IOKA process and the NIH syndrome are also consistent with the 
mechanisms and outcomes associated with in-group favoritism: a confrontation with 
acquired technologies may create instability between internal and external knowledge. A 
greater level of identification with the company implies a stronger bias in favor of 




in-group favoritism may have positive effects on firm activities (Gioia et al., 2000), it can 
also favor in-group bias toward ideas generated outside the group. For example, 
socialization practices help preserve in-group favoritism and create negative biases 
against out-group knowledge (Burcharth and Fosfuri, 2012). 
As suggested by research on inward-looking behavior, in-group favoritism, and 
the NIH syndrome, internal-knowledge reliance may substitute for external knowledge. 
As a consequence, this negative behavior can lower the effectiveness with which external 
technologies are integrated within a firm’s value chain. Therefore, I consider the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1. An inward-oriented knowledge accumulation (IOKA) process within the firm 
reduces the marginal effect of investments in external knowledge on firm 
performance. 
 
To fully understand the performance implication of the inward orientation of the 
firm, I focus on two conditioning factors that may affect the interaction between internal-
knowledge reliance and external technology. It is crucial to identify the context in which 
the negative bias may be stronger or weaker. I highlight organizational and technological 
capabilities as two drivers that might affect the impact of inward-looking behavior. More 
precisely, I propose that the level of absorptive capacity and the decentralization of 
R&D's organizational structure are factors that may limit or emphasize the negative bias 




First, the focus on absorptive capacity is justified by the role played by a firm’s 
knowledge base in the selection and assimilation of external knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). The integration of external knowledge is 
influenced by the level of absorptive capacity; thus, the negative effect of inward-looking 
behavior depends on the company’s knowledge base. High levels of absorptive capacity 
do not necessarily imply that the NIH syndrome cannot occur, due to the fact that inward-
looking firms may still fail to understand the potential of external knowledge. As a 
consequence, firms may not effectively integrate and use the acquired knowledge. 
However, firms with higher absorptive capacity should be able to reduce the uncertainty 
and bias toward external knowledge and, therefore, should not have a strong negative 
attitude toward acquired knowledge (Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2006). This process differs 
from IOKA: absorptive capacity doesn’t directly compare internal and external 
knowledge sources since firms use their knowledge base to evaluate external knowledge, 
while IOKA directly contrasts them, creating possible tension. In fact, absorptive 
capacity reduces uncertainty and identifies potential synergies with existing knowledge, 
whereas IOKA refers to the preference of adopting the stock of internal knowledge 
instead of the acquired one. 
Indeed, absorptive capacity reduces the level of uncertainty related to external 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Volberda et al., 2010). If firms are able to better 
understand external technologies, they may also better assess their quality and their 
overlap with internal knowledge. In other words, absorptive capacity influences the 
perception and accessibility of external knowledge. As shown by Rothaermel and 




that combines internal and external sources. Their results suggest that a firm’s knowledge 
base facilitates the balance between internal and external technologies, thus reducing the 
contraposition arising from inward- and outward- looking behaviors. Firms can leverage 
their knowledge base to bridge across knowledge boundaries and increase their 
performance (Reagans and McEvily, 2003).  
It follows that higher levels of absorptive capacity facilitate knowledge 
evaluation, therefore mediating between the perceived superiority of internal knowledge 
and the potential threat posed by external sources. Firms with higher levels of absorptive 
capacity will be able to better evaluate the potential synergies and the risks associated 
with the acquisition of external knowledge. In other words, absorptive capacity increases 
the overall level of information about the acquired knowledge, making it less ambiguous; 
as a result, the internal knowledge base sheds light on the quality and applicability of the 
knowledge. Inversely, the lack of absorptive capacity facilitates biased perceptions of 
external knowledge, thus favoring attitudes such as inward-looking behavior, in-group 
favoritism and the NIH syndrome. Following this reasoning, I expect that the negative 
bias toward external knowledge will be mitigated by absorptive capacity. As a result, I 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. Absorptive capacity moderates the relationship between an inward-oriented 






Second, I suggest that the level of organizational decentralization can affect the 
bias toward external technologies. Previous research has found that firms that focus on 
basic research adopt a more centralized R&D structure, whereas those that focus on 
applied and incremental research adopt a decentralized organization (Argyres and 
Silverman, 2004). The paper by Argyres and Silverman (2004) opens an important 
discussion on how R&D organization affects the direction and the importance of 
technology investments. My study aims to expand their findings in several ways. First, I 
focus on the impact of decentralization on a firm’s value rather than a firm’s innovative 
performance. Second, I consider the level of decentralization used as a moderating role 
between the exploitation of internal knowledge and the acquisition of external 
knowledge. Finally, Argyres and Silverman (2004) define external research in terms of 
how much the focal firm cites external patents, but they discount the importance of the 
acquisition of external technologies through mechanisms like M&A and licensing; I link 
the role of organizational structure to the adoption of licensed technologies using a value 
function approach. 
Arora et al. (2013b) define firms as decentralized when their internal business 
units are involved in the licensing decision, and centralized when their internal business 
units are not involved in the licensing decision.
12
 The effect of centralized and 
decentralized firms on the inward-looking attitude relies on the trade-off between private 
information about the external technology and economic incentives. Internal business 
                                                          
12
 In my data I don’t directly observe whether a business unit is involved in the licensing process, but I rely 
on patent assignment to define the level of decentralization. The underlying assumption is that patents are 
often assigned to either the parent company or its affiliates and that patent ownership may reflect 
involvement in the technology acquisition process. I acknowledge that there may be corporate policies that 
assign patents ownership regardless of the organizational structure. I discuss the validity of this measure in 




units may have superior knowledge and information about licensed technologies, while a 
centralized licensing unit may focus more on the economic incentives connected to 
licensing opportunities. As a consequence, the technology source mix differs among 
these two different type of organizations: centralized firms rely more on internal R&D, 
whereas decentralized companies exploit more external knowledge (Arora et al., 2013a). 
 In the case of centralization, the licensing decision is imposed by the dedicated 
unit to the focal business unit. As a consequence, the acquired knowledge may be not 
adequately integrated because of two factors that facilitate a negative attitude toward 
external knowledge: the acquisition of substitute technologies and the allocation of R&D 
resources. Since the selection of the external technology is decided by the centralized 
licensing unit, the new technology may substitute for internal knowledge, in which case 
the external technology may work against the interest of the business units. Internal 
incentives such as internal unit productivity may limit the adoption of external 
technology because it is perceived as a threat (Katz and Allen, 1982). In addition, the 
acquisition of external technologies can reduce the resources available for internal 
research and diminish incentives for innovation (Hitt et al., 1990). For example, in 2009, 
GlaxoSmithKline diverted some of its internal resources toward a more open strategy: the 
company divested its neuroscience program in order to allocate 50% of its R&D budget 
to external projects (Knowles and Higgins, 2011). Moreover, the reduction of funds for 
the internal unit led to a reduction of both the monetary and non-monetary incentives 
(Hitt et al., 1990; Stern, 2004). Based on these arguments, it follows that centralized 
firms are more likely to manifest inward-looking behavior and express a negative attitude 




Alternatively, decentralized companies do not impose the decision to buy external 
technologies and they do involve business units in the acquisition process. The joint 
effort between headquarters and business units creates a cooperative environment that 
should favor the adoption of external technologies. Since business units are directly 
involved in the procurement decision, they may perceive external knowledge as less 
threatening because the business units experience a higher level of decision-making 
freedom compared to centralized organizations. Even in the case of decentralization, 
however, the resource reallocation problem may be present. To solve this issue, Arora et 
al. (2013b) suggest that the business unit share both the cost and the profit of the acquired 
technology. This strategy should align the information and economic incentives of both 
the business unit and the corporate headquarters. It follows that decentralization should 
reduce the negative bias toward external knowledge and mitigate the negative effect of 
inward-looking behavior.  
In summary, centralization favors a contraposition and direct comparison between 
internal and external knowledge; this process should favor the development of the 
negative bias toward acquired knowledge. Conversely, decentralization favors a more 
cooperative organizational environment: subsidiaries have the freedom to invest in the 
technologies that best fit their necessities. In addition, when firms adopt a decentralized 
structure, subsidiaries can play the role of knowledge gatekeepers between the external 
environment and the organization. Past research has identified them as possible 
mechanisms that firms can use to manage and reduce biases introduced by inward-
oriented knowledge (Katz and Allen, 1982; Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2006). As a result, 




H3. Higher levels of decentralization moderate the relationship between an 
inward-oriented knowledge accumulation (IOKA) process and investments in 
external knowledge. 
 
3.3. Empirical data and methodology 
I test the hypotheses on an unbalanced panel of 92 pharmaceutical companies that 
were active between 1997 and 2008. The sample is based on a unique dataset built from a 
variety of sources. First, I identified all the companies listed in the FDA Orange Book 
that had an approved drug. Next, these companies were matched to the Deloitte-ReCap 
database to collect data on licensing investment and external technology acquisition (e.g., 
royalties, up-front payments and milestones). Data on R&D productivity and drug 
development (e.g., the various stages of clinical trials, FDA approval and project 
discontinuations) was collected from Pharmaprojects. 
Data on total R&D expenditures and the number of firm employees was collected 
from Compustat. Sales from new products and advertising expenditures were obtained 
from IMS MIDAS™. The promotion data includes investments directed toward 
physicians and hospitals, journal advertising and direct-mail to promote drugs. Finally, 
granted patents were collected from the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) patent database to build citation measures. As described by Graham and 
Higgins (2007), I limited my analysis to pharmaceutical-related patents in the 
international technology classes A61K and C07D. Patents listed in these two international 
technology classes identify technologies related to pharmaceutical products; they exclude 




on these two patent classes to study the primary outcome of the R&D activity of 
pharmaceutical firms that relates to drug development. All financial variables are 
presented in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  
In order to examine the effects of inward-looking behavior, I estimated several 
panel regressions, including panel random effects, panel fixed effects and panel GMM 
with fixed effects. The different empirical methods are needed to take potential 
endogeneity problems into consideration. For all the specifications, I estimate the 
following equation: 
 
(1)                                                   
                                      
 
where          represents the firm value at time t for firm i.          and 
          are the licensing investments and inward-oriented knowledge accumulated for 
firm i at time t-1, respectively. Finally,        includes the linear term of the interacted 
variables and other firm controls;           are firm- and time-fixed effects, respectively; 
and ϵit is the error term. 
Empirically, the first hypothesis advocates that the cross partial derivative of 
Equation (1) with respect to licensing and inward-looking behavior is negative. To test 
the second hypothesis, I divide the sample based on the median level of absorptive 
capacity and estimate Equation (1) using the two subsamples. To confirm H2, I expect 
the coefficient β1 to be larger for firms with high levels of absorptive capacity. I adopt a 




median value of the level of decentralization. I expect to find the coefficient β1 to be 




3.3.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study, Market capitalization, is measured by 
calculating the product of the average share price and the number of shares outstanding. 
The data was collected from the COMPUSTAT database. Internal innovative 
development is an essential driver of firm value because it transforms innovations into 
final products. Similarly, knowledge acquired externally can strengthen and boost the 
effect of product development (Chesbrough, 2006). The variable used in the empirical 
regressions is transformed as ln(1+ MktCapi,t). 
 
3.3.2. Independent variables 
The Licensing investment variable is one of the main independent variables, and it 
represents a firm’s external knowledge acquisition. To measure licensing investments, I 
relied on data collected from the Deloitte-Recap database. My measure includes both up-
front and milestone payments. Royalties are not included because they represent a cost 
based on future sales, and are thus unobservable within the scope of this study. Licensing 
stock is measured using a perpetual inventory method with a 15% discount factor (Hall et 
al., 2005) and then transformed using the natural logarithm. 
The Inward Oriented Knowledge Accumulation (IOKA) variable measures the use 
and adoption of internal knowledge of the focal firm. This measure represents the degree 
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to which the focal firm draws from prior technologies developed internally. Following 
Hall et al. (2005) and Agrawal et al. (2010), the number of all backward patent citations 
and the number of self-citations were collected. The formula used to measure the 
adoption of internal knowledge was: 
 
        
   
 
   
. 
 
For each company, Cit
S
 represents the total number of self-citations (based on 
assignee) of all patents for firm i at time t, and Cit represents the total number of citations 
of all patents assigned to firm i at time t. This measure captures firm i’s attitude toward 
internal knowledge: inward-looking behavior will be high when self-citations represent 
the majority of total backward citations. Similarly to the licensing variable, IOKA is 
measured as a stock variable with a 15% depreciation rate and is transformed using the 
natural logarithm. 
To account for the size of the patent portfolio, I adopt the ratio of the stock of 
self-citations to the patent stock as a robustness measure (Hall et al., 2005). Self-citations 
suggest that a firm has a strong technology position, allowing it to internalize the 
spillovers generated by its internal R&D projects; however, this effect is linked to the 
size of the patent portfolio simply because the more patents a firm has, the more likely a 
new citation is given to a patent that the company already owns (Hall et al., 2005).  
I adopt Publication stock as a measure of absorptive capacity. As suggested by 




of the complementarity between internal and external innovation strategies. The variable 
is computed as the focal firm’s cumulative number of scientific publications. To test the 
robustness of my results, I adopt alternative measures of absorptive capacity: following 
Arora and Gambardella (1994b), I defined the stock of scientific references (Scientific 
references stock) and the cumulative stock of internal R&D (R&D stock) as robustness 
measures. Based on each of these measures, I create three dummy variables that equal 
one if the focal firm is above the median value of the absorptive capacity variable. Firms 
that are above the median values have higher levels of absorptive capacity, so they should 
be able to better integrate external technologies and mitigate the negative bias introduced 
by inward-looking behavior. 
Following Arora et al. (2013a), I construct a measure for R&D decentralization 
based on patent assignments (Decentralization). First, I collected data on the corporate 
tree structure from the D&B Million Dollar Database. This allows distinguishing between 
corporate headquarters and corporate subsidiaries. Then I collected and classified the 
assignee of all patents assigned to the firms in my sample and matched the assignee with 
either the corporate headquarters or the subsidiaries. I classify individual patents as 
decentralized if the patent ownership is assigned to one of the firm’s affiliates. Third, I 
estimated the yearly percentage of decentralized patents for each firm. Values closer to 
one suggest that the firm adopts a decentralized R&D organizational structure and that it 
delegates a certain level of autonomy over R&D management to its subsidiaries. The 
distribution of several self-citation measures as proxy of inward-looking behavior for 
both centralized and decentralized firms is displayed in Figure 3.1. The difference in 




level. The non-parametric results are in line with the theoretical predictions that 
decentralized firms should suffer less from inward-looking behavior. 
In addition, the data confirms a pattern of organizational structure for firms whose 
organization is well known. For example, Abbott Laboratories and Eli Lilly assign about 
10% and 5% of their patents to subsidiaries, respectively. These two firms have been 
traditionally associated with centralized organizations (Mayer, 2003). Similarly, Pfizer 
assigns about 95% of its patents to the corporate headquarter, which is consistent with the 
known hierarchical structure of the company (Hill and Jones, 2012, p. 356). A contrasting 
example is provided by Johnson & Johnson, which is renowned for its decentralized-
management approach.
14
 In my data only a small percentage of patents (about 3%) is 
assigned to the corporate headquarter. 
Finally, Arora et al. (2013a) compare their measure with the one adopted by 
Argyres and Silverman (2004). They were able to match 56 of the 71 firms in Argyres 
and Silverman (2004); 70% of them were perfectly coded as either centralized, hybrid or 
decentralized. Overall, the adoption of patents to determine the level of decentralization 
may present some limitations: it is possible that patent assignments are defined by 
corporate policy, regardless of the actual organizational structure. Argyres and Silverman 
(2004) used data on R&D funding at both the corporate and the R&D unit level to code 
the level of decentralization. While their approach may be more reliable, it is based on 
survey data, making it difficult to replicate. The use of patents has three advantages: (1) it 
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is based on observable factors, (2) it is easy to replicate and (3) it can be applied to both 











3.3.3. Instrumental variables 
In order to deal with the potential endogeneity introduced by licensing 
investments, I used several variables as instruments in the GMM estimations. I used 
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trademarks, average drug novelty, the number of competitors, the development speed of 
compounds in the pipeline and the expected market size of the average product in the 
pipeline as instruments for licensing and R&D. The source of endogeneity, in this case, 
comes from unobserved factors that may drive both the firm value as well as the decision 
to invest in licensing agreements and R&D. The test for overidentifying restrictions is 
reported for all the GMM estimations and is significant in all my specifications. The 
xtoverid command in Stata 12 was used to test for overidentification (Schaffer and 
Stillman, 2006). The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom 
equal to the difference between the number of excluded instruments and the number of 
regressors. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments (Schaffer and 
Stillman, 2006). 
Trademarks are often used to reinforce the appropriability of innovation returns 
(Fosfuri et al., 2008). Therefore, trademarks could be associated with licensing and R&D 
investments as a mechanism to protect the innovative output. Firms can invest in 
trademarks to secure legal protection of their investments in marketing and 
complementary assets. The trademarks variable represents the cumulative number of 
trademarks assigned to firm i, and it is transformed using the natural logarithm. Data on 
trademarks was collected from the USPTO database. One limit of this instrument relates 
to the relation of intangible assets with market value: these assets account for a greater 
value of market capitalization, and this effect can change based on the organizational 
structure. Centralized firms should have more intangible assets because they are a key 








Pharmaprojects contains independent ratings about the novelty of pharmaceutical 
compounds and the speed of development. For each compound in the pipeline, novelty is 
ranked on a 6-point scale in which higher values represent more innovative drugs. In 
Pharmaprojects, highly innovative compounds with unknown development strategies 
receive higher scores than drugs with established development strategies. In the case of 
novel drugs, firms should invest in R&D and licensing to boost their innovative 
production and reduce development uncertainty. I measured firm novelty as the natural 
logarithm of the percentage of drugs with the highest novelty rank (i.e., those with 6 
points in the Pharmaprojects scale). On average, 17 % of the compounds in all 
development stages are highly innovative. A similar discussion can consider the 
development speed of pipeline compounds. Firms that invest in internal R&D and in 
external technology sources are able to increase the speed of development. 
Pharmaprojects includes a 4-point scale rating for the development speed of each 
compound in the pipeline. The instrumental variable is computed as the percentage of 
compounds with the highest development speed and transformed using the natural 
logarithm. 
When a market is highly competitive, firms may have greater incentives to invest 
in innovative activities in order to develop new products and, potentially, gain a 
competitive advantage. I used the number of competitors in the same primary therapeutic 
area as a proxy for the incentive to be innovative and productive. Competition should 
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trigger a more aggressive innovative behavior: firms may increase their investments in 
R&D and licensing to boost their productivity and introduce new products to protect or 
establish market leadership. The competitors variable was collected from the IMS 
database and it represents the number of companies with at least one product in the main 
therapeutic area of the focal firm. The variable is transformed using the natural logarithm. 
Finally, I use the expected market size to proxy for exogenous drivers of the 
future demand of the firm. If the expected size of the market is large, firms have 
incentives to increase their innovative effort through R&D and licensing investments in 
order to develop a final product and appropriate the associated revenues (Acemoglu and 
Linn, 2004). Pharmaprojects includes estimates of the potential market size for 
compounds in development. I compute the expected market size for the focal firm by 
averaging the values of all the drugs in the pipeline in each year and then transforming it 
using the natural logarithm. 
 
3.3.4. Controls 
As proxy for the knowledge base of the company, I included the stock of patents 
assigned to the focal firm (patent). I included the number of employees to account for the 
effects related to the company size (firm size). The data was collected from Compustat. 
The firms in my sample employ a mean of approximately 15000 employees. Finally, I 
included specifications with time- trend dummies, main therapeutic areas (ATCs)
17
 and 
firm-specific dummies to control for firm heterogeneity. In models without firm-fixed 
effects, I also included geographic-location dummies (North America and Europe). 
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Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 3.1 and in Table 3.2, 
respectively (both in Chapter 3 Appendix).  
 
3.4. Results 
The benchmark estimates to test my hypotheses are reported in Table 3.3. I use 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization at time t-1 as dependent variable in all the 
specifications, while I use the 1-year lag for the independent variables transformed using 
the natural logarithm. Inward-looking behavior is measured by the percentage of 
backward self-citations. All models reported include year dummies and main therapeutic 
area ATC dummies. I use publication as a measure of absorptive capacity. All models are 
based on Equation (1), and they are estimated with three different methods: random 
effect, fixed effect and GMM with fixed effect. To test the first hypothesis, I compute the 
derivative with respect to licensing and IOKA, which is given by the coefficient of the 
interaction between these two variables. If firms show high levels of inward-looking 
behavior, they should suffer a negative bias toward external technologies; thus, I expect 
the sign of the marginal effect to be negative. As predicted, the interaction term between 
the IOKA and licensing investment variables has a negative sign across all specifications. 
The coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level 
for the random effect and fixed effect models, respectively.  
The combined effect of IOKA and licensing in Model 6 presents the same 
magnitude and sign as the other models; however, it is not statistically significant. The 
lack of significance in this specification may be attributed to weak instruments. The 




statistic of the first stage is significant at the 5% level but below the conventional value of 
10. The presence of weak instruments favors the rejection of the null hypothesis; 




Table 3.3 Main results. Dependent variable Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





  -0.538 
  (0.222)  (0.313)  (0.624) 
Licensing 0.034 0.082
*
 -0.004 0.037 -0.094 -0.278 










 (1.270) (1.409) (1.571) (1.341) (0.932) (1.873) 
Decentralization -0.308
*
 -0.267 -0.329 -0.273 -0.160 -0.092 
 (0.178) (0.171) (0.220) (0.214) (0.199) (0.218) 
Patent -0.058 -0.019 -0.103 -0.099 -0.138 -0.090 






















 (0.123) (0.120) (0.286) (0.297) (0.540) (0.704) 
North America -0.191 -0.141     
 (0.228) (0.225)     
Europe -0.143 -0.314     
 (0.479) (0.482)     
Obs. 526 526 526 526 526 526 
Num. Clusters 79 79 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.823 0.825 0.365 0.466   
Hansen test     7.882 6.470 
Hansen p-value     0.445 0.486 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 IOKA is defined as the percentage of backward self-citations.  
Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted. 
The F-stat of the first stage for Licensing is 2.377** for Models 5 and 6. The endogenous variables are instrumented 






These results support the first hypothesis and confirm the substitute effect 
between inward-looking behavior and the adoption of external technologies. The 
magnitude of the coefficient represents a standard elasticity, suggesting that a 10% 
increase in both licensing investments and backward self-citations would yield a 
reduction in firm value of about 0.5%. In particular, the results in Table 3.3 suggest that 
when companies increasingly exploit internal knowledge, they may not be able to fully 
integrate acquired technologies. As a consequence, if firms consider their internal 
knowledge superior to external knowledge and adopt an inward-looking attitude, they 
may reject external technologies.  
To test for the second and third hypotheses and understand the impact of 
organizational factors on the effect of inward-looking behavior, I re-estimate Equation (1) 
on different subsamples defined by the level of absorptive capacity and decentralization. 
The results are reported in Table 3.4 (in Chapter 3 Appendix). The first six models split 
the sample, based on the median value of the stock of publications. In particular, Models 
1 to 3 are based on observations that are below the median value while Models 4 to 6 are 
estimated using observations above the median value. Similarly, Models 7 to 12 adopt 
subsamples based on the median value of decentralization. Models 7 to 9 are based on 
observations below the median, while Models 10 to 12 use the subsample with 
decentralization values above the median.  
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that the joint effect of IOKA and licensing 
is more evident in firms with low levels of absorptive capacity and firms that adopt a 
centralized organizational structure. For example, comparing the random effect models 




the difference between the coefficients of the interacted variable is negative.
18
 Therefore, 
the difference between the two models suggests that firms with low levels of absorptive 
capacity experience more bias toward licensed technologies than firms with high levels of 
absorptive capacity. 
The results are consistent across all models and support both my second and third 
hypotheses. Firms can use decentralization and absorptive capacity as mechanisms to 
moderate the negative bias introduced by inward-looking behavior. These results suggest 
that firms can mitigate the substitutability between IOKA and external technologies 
through higher levels of absorptive capacity or a decentralized organizational structure. 
The contribution of these results is twofold. First, results on absorptive capacity are in 
line with those of Rothaermel and Alexandre (2009): absorptive capacity allows firms to 
capture the benefits from different technology sources. Firms can engage in different 
innovative activities and minimize the negative attitude against external knowledge. 
Second, these results expand our understanding of decentralized organizational structure. 
They empirically test and expand the model introduced by Arora et al. (2013b) and 
demonstrate how licensing activity should be organized: in the case of decentralization, 
firms can profit from business units' superior information about external technologies and 
facilitate the integration with existing knowledge. 
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absorptive capacity. The coefficient in Model 1 (low absorptive capacity) equals -1.279 and the coefficient 
in Model 4 (high absorptive capacity) is -0.274. The difference is -1.005, suggesting that the negative 





3.5. Robustness analyses 
3.5.1. Alternative measures of absorptive capacity 
The results provided in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 are robust to alternative 
estimation methods. Different estimates were used to verify this conclusion.  All the 
methods adopted represent different ways to control for unobserved, firm-specific 
differences. The random effects model assumes that firm heterogeneity is random and 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, while the fixed effects model controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that a firm fixed component is correlated with the 
explanatory variables. I also implemented an instrumental variable approach to help 
reduce endogeneity by using instruments that are uncorrelated with the error term.  
To further validate the results, I adopt two alternative measures of absorptive 
capacity: the stock of R&D investments and the stock of scientific references. Table 3.5 
replicates the benchmark regressions reported in Table 3.3: Models 1 to 3 use a dummy 
for absorptive capacity based on the stock of R&D, while Models 4 to 6 adopt the stock 
of scientific references as a measure of absorptive capacity.  
The results confirm previous findings and support the first hypothesis. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients is also similar to those in Table 3.3, suggesting 
that a 10% increase in both IOKA and licensing reduces market capitalization by about 
0.5%. The joint effect of licensing and IOKA is negative as predicted by H1, though it is 
insignificant for the GMM models. As mentioned in the previous section, the use of 
instruments that are statistically valid but with low explanatory power favors the rejection 




Table 3.5 Alternative measure of Absorptive capacity. Dependent variable 
Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
 AC:R&D  AC: Scientific References 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 










 (0.223) (0.312) (0.572)  (0.228) (0.318) (0.559) 
Licensing 0.079
*
 0.036 -0.311  0.080
*
 0.036 -0.215 














 (1.468) (1.401) (1.702)  (1.489) (1.437) (1.677) 
AC 0.076 0.018 0.078  0.193 0.233 0.154 
 (0.180) (0.196) (0.244)  (0.175) (0.179) (0.141) 
Decentralization -0.243 -0.267 -0.134  -0.244 -0.240 -0.174 
 (0.174) (0.218) (0.198)  (0.176) (0.221) (0.187) 
Patent -0.019 -0.099 0.001  -0.066 -0.161 -0.066 
























 (0.117) (0.296) (0.607)  (0.119) (0.295) (0.527) 
North America -0.156    -0.121   
 (0.218)    (0.227)   
Europe -0.323    -0.311   
 (0.482)    (0.489)   
Obs. 526 526 526  526 526 526 
Num. Clusters 79 79 79  79 79 79 
R-squared 0.826 0.467   0.825 0.458  
Hansen test   6.307    7.370 
Hansen p-value   0.613    0.497 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. IOKA is defined as the percentage of backward self-citations. 
Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted.  
The F-stats of the first stage for Licensing are 2.625*** and 1.873* for models 3 and 6, respectively. The endogenous 





I test the robustness of the second and third hypotheses in Table 3.6a and Table 
3.6b (in Chapter 3 Appendix). The former includes the stock of R&D as a measure of 




to Table 3.4, I present the benchmark regressions estimated on the split samples. The 
results show that the lack of absorptive capacity and the restrictions imposed by a 
centralized organizational structure emphasize the substitutability between internal 
knowledge and licensed technologies. 
 
3.5.2. Alternative measures 
 The ratio of the stock of self-citations to the stock of patents as measures of IOKA is 
depicted in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 (in Chapter 3 Appendix). They replicate Equation (1) 
using the full sample and the split samples, respectively. Table 3.7 shows strong support 
for the first hypothesis. The exploitation of internal knowledge substitutes for the 
adoption of licensed technologies. Similar to other GMM estimations of Equation (1), the 
coefficients of the interacted variable in the GMM models are not significant, but they 
show the predicted negative sign and similar magnitude across all specifications. 
My results on the second and third hypotheses are robust using the new measure of 
IOKA. As shown in Table 3.8, the coefficients of the interacted variable for the low 
absorptive capacity subsample models are significant and always smaller than the 
corresponding coefficients in the high absorptive capacity models. The same results are 
confirmed when I compare centralized and decentralized firms. 
 
3.6. Discussion and conclusion 
By analyzing licensing investment choices and R&D organizational structures, this 




First, it has implications for the markets for technology literature, as it suggests that 
an IOKA process reduces the marginal effect of licensed technology on firms’ market 
value. There exists a trade-off between the propensities to use internal knowledge and 
invest in external technologies. Despite the extensive literature on licensing transactions 
and the boundary of the firm, there is still a surprising lack of understanding about how 
firms are able to combine the licensed knowledge. It has been shown that companies can 
use external technologies to lower product development uncertainty (Danzon et al., 
2005), fill capability gaps (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009) and boost innovative production 
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990). However, firms may prefer the use of internal 
knowledge for several reasons: it facilitates the creation of norms and communication 
mechanisms, favors economies of scope, and rejects out-group knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Ingram and Simons, 2002; Parmigiani, 2007).  
The results reported here expand our understanding of the relationship between the 
use of internal knowledge and the adoption of licensed technologies; in particular, the 
estimated coefficients suggest a substitute relationship. Companies that specialize in the 
use of their internal knowledge may experience a negative bias toward external 
technologies and, as a consequence, suffer from the NIH syndrome. As a result, the focus 
on internal knowledge may create a systematic bias toward external technology adoption. 
It follows that the reliance on internal knowledge has two contrasting effects. On one 
hand, companies can exploit social integration among employees to create a unique set of 
values, needs and beliefs, and consolidate internal knowledge flows to increase 
performance (Gioia et al., 2000). In addition, firms can rely on their own knowledge to 




internal innovative effort (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). On the other hand, an inward-
looking process may generate the NIH syndrome and introduce a negative attitude with 
respect to external knowledge, leading to an inefficient integration of acquired 
technologies (Agrawal et al., 2010; Katz and Allen, 1982). Ultimately, this may reduce 
the firm’s ability to implement an open-innovation strategy as well as the ability to rely 
on the market for technology. 
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on centralization or decentralization of 
R&D and the allocation of resources (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Arora et al., 2013a; 
Arora et al., 2013b). Centralized firms may suffer from a negative relationship because 
the licensing decision and the allocation of R&D resources are established by 
headquarters. The lack of participation by subsidiaries increases the likelihood of the 
rejection of external knowledge. In contrast, the results provide evidence that 
decentralized firms suffer less from inward-looking behavior. I find that their 
organizational structure affects the relation between internal and external knowledge and 
reduces the negative bias toward external technologies. Overall, decentralization allows 
for the exploitation of private information held by R&D units and facilitates a less hostile 
environment toward external technologies. These results are in line with the idea 
promoted by Williamson (1985), that decentralization enhances the incentives of unit 
managers and favors a better information flow within the organization. 
Third, this paper confirms the role of absorptive capacity as a moderating variable 
that can reduce the negative bias toward external technologies. The integration of 
external knowledge is determined by the level of absorptive capacity possessed by the 




technologies, which allows firms to better select them. Firms can use their knowledge 
base to create bridges across knowledge sources (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; 
Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009).  
Although this study has some limitations, it offers potential areas for future research. 
First, the reported results do not identify the underlying mechanisms by which internal 
knowledge generates inward-looking behavior. Thus, it is important to specify that the 
empirical regressions do not establish any direction of causality; rather, they express the 
conditional correlations between my measures. Future research should explore the 
identification of the development of the IOKA process, and link its impact on novel 
organizational factors. Second, though the instrumental variables are valid as reported by 
the Hansen test of overidentification, their explanatory power may be weak. While the F-
statistics of the first stage regressions are significant, at least at the 10% level, they are 
below the conventional value of 10. Therefore, the GMM estimations may suffer from 
biased standard errors that lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis too often. However, it 
is crucial to point out that the sign and magnitude of the GMM coefficients are similar to 
other estimation methods and are in line with my hypotheses. Third, by only analyzing 
the pharmaceutical industry, I may limit the generalization of these results to other 
industries; therefore, a deeper analysis into other industries is necessary to fully 
understand the impact of inward-looking behavior and its conditioning factors.  
Finally, from a practical point of view, this study has important managerial 
implications. This paper shows the importance of managing knowledge within 
organizational boundaries and the role played by organizational structure in adopting and 




knowledge to reduce their costs and to specialize on technological trajectories; however, 
the same attitude may limit the ability to integrate external knowledge that may help with 
market value. In addition, managers should be aware that the make-versus-buy decision 
should account for organizational characteristics such as the decentralization level and 





CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market capitalization 20,709.200 41,705.130 1.024 290,444 
Licensing stock 12,556.830 58,964.940 0 935,353 
% Self-citation 0.081 0.128 0 1 
Self-citation Stock/Patent Stock  0.427 0.569 0 3.408 
R&D Stock 2,867.351 8,005.418 0 76,857 
Publication Stock 647.189 1,775.481 0 16,645 
Scientific references Stock 531.549 1,489.949 0 13,633 
Decentralization 0.442 0.455 0 1 
Competitors 1,262.472 571.965 191 2,701 
Market size 7,070,323 12,500,000 0 104,000,000 
Speed 0.065 0.145 0 1 
Novelty 0.173 0.304 0 1 
Trademarks stock 17.235 60.623 0 832 
Patent stock 86.839 232.096 0 2,121 
Firm size (thousands) 15.408 28.618 0 138 
North America 0.847 0.360 0 1 
Europe 0.120 0.325 0 1 
 




Table 3.2 Correlation Table 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1.Market capitalization 1 
                
2.Licensing stock 0.471 1 
               
3.% Self-citation 0.126 0.054 1 
              
4.Self-citation /Patent  -0.006 -0.043 0.735 1 
             
5.R&D Stock 0.740 0.786 0.065 -0.022 1 
            
6.Publication Stock 0.652 0.555 0.053 -0.049 0.815 1 
           
7.Scientific references Stock 0.558 0.552 0.326 0.120 0.659 0.609 1 
          
8.Decentralization 0.055 0.112 -0.203 -0.139 0.099 0.130 -0.006 1 
         
9.Competitors 0.160 0.178 0.031 -0.118 0.245 0.234 0.190 0.020 1 
        
10.Market size 0.119 0.010 -0.034 0.001 0.061 -0.006 0.036 0.063 0.091 1 
       
11.Speed -0.043 0.019 0.189 0.025 0.014 -0.011 -0.042 0.037 0.132 -0.106 1 
      
12.Novelty 0.163 0.150 0.313 0.060 0.160 0.156 0.151 -0.046 0.028 -0.125 0.250 1 
     
13.Trademarks stock 0.485 0.392 -0.002 0.003 0.663 0.677 0.309 -0.017 0.115 0.067 0.001 0.056 1 
    
14.Patent stock 0.579 0.582 0.319 0.115 0.687 0.609 0.995 -0.028 0.198 0.037 -0.045 0.152 0.332 1 
   
15.Firm size (thousands) 0.883 0.499 0.108 0.034 0.743 0.650 0.542 0.034 0.180 0.140 -0.005 0.082 0.503 0.568 1 
  
16.North America -0.133 -0.258 0.160 0.134 -0.144 -0.097 -0.009 -0.134 -0.314 0.026 -0.019 -0.245 -0.060 -0.028 -0.173 1 
 







Table 3.4 Split sample regressions. Dependent variable Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
Low AC  High AC   Centralized   Decentralized  
RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM 


















 (0.330) (0.788) (0.885)  (0.318) (0.371) (0.507)  (0.358) (0.414) (0.683)  (0.218) (0.247) (0.484) 
Licensing 0.175
***




























 -0.387  -0.401 -0.186 -0.064  0.410 0.323 0.346 
 (0.303) (0.377) (0.245)  (0.215) (0.252) (0.255)  (0.338) (0.314) (0.306)  (0.300) (0.316) (0.387) 









 (0.138) (0.212) (0.150)  (0.070) (0.136) (0.125)  (0.106) (0.220) (0.298)  (0.090) (0.162) (0.119) 
Publication 0.248
***
 -0.103 0.005  0.119
*
 -0.076 -0.045  0.150 -0.598
**
 -0.332  0.122
*
 0.046 0.044 
 (0.086) (0.216) (0.156)  (0.068) (0.098) (0.080)  (0.094) (0.281) (0.226)  (0.071) (0.124) (0.077) 
Firm Size 1.210
***










 0.435 -0.584 
 (0.181) (0.760) (0.575)  (0.125) (0.287) (0.710)  (0.191) (0.347) (0.656)  (0.119) (0.443) (0.726) 
North America 0.251    -0.303    0.336    -0.359
*
   
 (0.292)    (0.378)    (0.597)    (0.217)   
Europe 0.701    -0.070    0.005    -0.212   
 (0.876)    (0.486)    (0.667)    (0.467)   
Obs. 302 302 302  371 371 371  287 287 287  386 386 386 
Num. Clusters 55 55 55  58 58 58  51 51 51  72 72 72 
R-Squared .808311 .057783   .798695 .558376   .770655 .151869   .88384 .296386  
Hansen test   9.367    7.154    6.873    5.052 
Hansen p-value   0.227    0.307    0.442    0.654 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
IOKA is defined as the percentage of backward self-citations.  
Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted. 
The F-stats of the first stage for Licensing are 2.957***, 2.838***, 2.830*** and 1.130 for Models 3, 6, 9 and 12, respectively. The endogenous variables are instrumented using: 





Table 3.6a Split sample regressions with R&D Stock as Absorptive Capacity. Dependent variable Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
Low AC  High AC   Centralized   Decentralized  
RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Licensing*IOKA -1.090
***








 -0.385 -0.155 
 (0.327) (0.541) (1.109)  (0.038) (0.039) (0.746)  (0.375) (0.475) (0.636)  (0.203) (0.242) (0.514) 
Licensing 0.098
**




 -0.167  0.045
*
 0.008 -0.074 












 (1.080) (1.110) (1.464)  (0.147) (0.150) (4.060)  (2.538) (1.787) (1.810)  (1.264) (1.321) (1.418) 
R&D Stock . . .  . . .  0.003 -0.089 -0.049  0.048 0.044 0.054 
         (0.275) (0.250) (0.271)  (0.174) (0.154) (0.167) 
Decentralization -0.007 -0.011 -0.107  -0.057 -0.041 -0.049  . . .  . . . 















  -0.078 -0.086 -0.062 
 (0.118) (0.208) (0.173)  (0.057) (0.057) (0.086)  (0.107) (0.234) (0.273)  (0.074) (0.083) (0.087) 
Publication 0.049 -0.062 0.005  0.077 -0.024 -0.026  0.236
***
 -0.485 -0.297  0.096 0.031 0.017 
 (0.080) (0.171) (0.160)  (0.055) (0.041) (0.085)  (0.089) (0.293) (0.256)  (0.060) (0.062) (0.095) 
Firm Size 1.274
***













 (0.199) (0.433) (0.557)  (0.093) (0.183) (0.524)  (0.174) (0.267) (0.543)  (0.109) (0.155) (0.215) 
North America -0.131    0.335    0.482    -0.239   
 (0.376)    (0.605)    (0.492)    (0.201)   
Europe 0.397    0.659    -0.349    0.272   
 (0.559)    (0.644)    (0.527)    (0.308)   
Obs. 283 283 272  390 390 386  237 237 227  436 436 428 
Num. Clusters 64 64 53  58 58 54  51 51 41  78 78 70 
R-Squared 0.645 0.326   0.767 0.305   0.831 0.061   0.839 0.602  
Hansen test   9.512    6.440    5.811    5.746 
Hansen p-value   0.218    0.376    0.562    0.570 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
IOKA is defined as the percentage of backward self-citations.  
Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted. 
The F-stats of the first stage for Licensing are 4.279***, 3.342***, 2.354*** and 0.921 for Models 3, 6, 9 and 12, respectively. The endogenous variables are instrumented using: 
Competitors, Market size, Novelty, Speed, Trademarks and their interactions with IOKA. 
“.” means the corresponding variable was dropped from estimation because of collinearity. The collinearity occurred because in the estimation I  used the dummy form of R&D 




Table 3.6b Split sample regressions with Scientific References Stock as Absorptive Capacity. Dependent variable 
Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
Low AC  High AC  Centralized  Decentralized 
RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Licensing*IOKA -0.713
*








 -0.375 -0.212 
 (0.386) (0.610) (0.502)  (0.322) (0.409) (0.558)  (0.400) (0.468) (0.639)  (0.208) (0.242) (0.521) 
Licensing 0.070
**




 0.007 -0.094 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.142)  (0.066) (0.077) (0.250)  (0.086) (0.107) (0.168)  (0.026) (0.028) (0.182) 









 (1.517) (1.434) (0.805)  (1.796) (1.871) (2.359)  (2.631) (1.876) (2.058)  (1.314) (1.367) (1.465) 
Scientific References Stock         0.316 0.342 0.627
***
  -0.036 -0.082 -0.135 
        (0.319) (0.309) (0.227)  (0.180) (0.165) (0.162) 
Decentralization 0.042 0.080 0.010  -0.152 -0.170 -0.100         







  -0.069 -0.126 -0.088  0.165 0.220 0.543
**
  -0.074 -0.072 -0.022 
 (0.174) (0.184) (0.203)  (0.064) (0.096) (0.167)  (0.123) (0.239) (0.243)  (0.084) (0.089) (0.095) 
Publication 0.121
*
 0.013 0.020  0.137
*






  0.096 0.030 0.012 
 (0.072) (0.129) (0.128)  (0.074) (0.079) (0.046)  (0.084) (0.253) (0.219)  (0.060) (0.061) (0.096) 
Firm Size 1.137
***













 (0.130) (0.172) (0.174)  (0.121) (0.288) (0.815)  (0.183) (0.291) (0.483)  (0.104) (0.162) (0.246) 
North America -0.284    0.046    0.549    -0.248   
 (0.285)    (0.331)    (0.546)    (0.203)   
Europe 0.607    -0.098    -0.265    0.269   
 (0.459)    (0.590)    (0.554)    (0.312)   
Obs. 319 319 319  354 354 354  237 237 237  436 436 436 
Num. Clusters 57 57 57  57 57 57  51 51 51  78 78 78 
R-Squared 0.685 0.116   0.805 0.326   0.830 0.030   0.839 0.597  
Hansen test   7.971    4.276    6.551    5.721 
Hansen p-value   0.335    0.639    0.477    0.573 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
IOKA is defined as the percentage of backward self-citations. Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted. 
The F-stats of the first stage for Licensing are 3.793***, 1.26, 5.043*** and 0.838 for Models 3, 6, 9 and 12, respectively. The endogenous variables are instrumented using: 
Competitors, Market size, Novelty, Speed, Trademarks and their interactions with IOKA. “.” means the corresponding variable was dropped from estimation because of 




Table 3.7 Robustness Regressions with IOKA defined as the stock of backward self-citations 
divided by the stock of patents. Dependent variable Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
 AC: Publication Stock  AC: R&D Stock  AC: Scientific References 
Stock 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 

























 0.062 -0.226 




















 (0.257) (0.288) (0.334)  (0.269) (0.299) (0.330)  (0.263) (0.294) (0.312) 
AC     0.045 -0.028 0.048  0.199 0.229 0.166 
     (0.171) (0.180) (0.220)  (0.162) (0.161) (0.136) 
Decentralization -0.206 -0.188 -0.078  -0.197 -0.203 -0.093  -0.186 -0.161 -0.107 
 (0.184) (0.229) (0.194)  (0.174) (0.213) (0.193)  (0.179) (0.221) (0.190) 
Patent -0.018 -0.080 0.032  -0.018 -0.080 0.034  -0.065 -0.141 -0.042 
 (0.072) (0.112) (0.158)  (0.072) (0.111) (0.158)  (0.079) (0.113) (0.136) 








 -0.095 -0.158 




















 (0.130) (0.263) (0.533)  (0.127) (0.264) (0.509)  (0.129) (0.261) (0.493) 
North America -0.114    -0.121    -0.092   
 (0.242)    (0.245)    (0.246)   
Europe -0.232    -0.234    -0.235   
 (0.515)    (0.518)    (0.525)   
Obs. 526 526 526  526 526 526  526 526 526 
Num. Clusters 79 79 79  79 79 79  79 79 79 
R-squared 0.820 0.429   0.820 0.431   0.819 0.423  
Hansen test   6.544    6.617    7.410 
Hansen p-value   0.587    0.579    0.493 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
IOKA is defined as the stock of backward self-citations divided by the stock of patents.  
Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted.  
The F-stats of the first stage for Licensing are 2.031**, 2.484**, 1.731* for Models 3, 6 and 9 respectively. The endogenous variables 
are instrumented using: Competitors, Market size, Novelty, Speed, Trademarks and their interactions with IOKA. 
The variable AC is the dummy form of R&D Stock and Scientific References Stock (1 if is above the sample median, 
and 0 if otherwise) for Models 4 to 6 and Models 7 to 9, respectively. When I use the continuous form of Scientific 





Table 3.8a Split sample regressions with Publication Stock as Absorptive Capacity and IOKA as the stock of backward self-citations 
divided by the stock of patents. Dependent variable Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
Low AC  High AC  Centralized  Decentralized 
RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM 





















 0.072  0.067 0.067 -0.029  0.155
*
 0.167 -0.211  0.059
**
 0.034 -0.017 














 (0.308) (0.362) (0.454)  (0.314) (0.349) (0.315)  (0.361) (0.365) (0.362)  (0.269) (0.313) (0.449) 
Publication . . .  . . .  0.097 0.135 0.310  -0.198 -0.091 -0.062 
         (0.340) (0.303) (0.203)  (0.179) (0.152) (0.155) 




  . . .  . . . 









  -0.103 -0.107 -0.085 
 (0.122) (0.163) (0.126)  (0.076) (0.113) (0.081)  (0.105) (0.242) (0.302)  (0.072) (0.075) (0.071) 
Firm Size 1.100
***




 0.550  0.892
***







 (0.172) (0.269) (0.220)  (0.106) (0.230) (0.345)  (0.190) (0.234) (0.537)  (0.105) (0.158) (0.198) 
North America -0.202    -0.299    0.213    -0.040   
 (0.340)    (0.285)    (0.434)    (0.240)   
Europe 1.049    0.014    -0.390    0.582
*
   
 (0.714)    (0.359)    (0.548)    (0.342)   
Obs. 302 302 302  371 371 371  237 237 237  436 436 436 
Num. Clusters 55 55 55  58 58 58  51 51 51  78 78 78 
R-Squared 0.692 0.145   0.779 0.485   0.848 0.211   0.833 0.536  
Hansen test   6.442    4.182    7.674    5.861 
Hansen p-value   0.489    0.652    0.362    0.556 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
IOKA is defined as the stock of backward self-citations divided by the stock of patents.  
Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted.  
The F-stats of the first stage for Licensing are 3.258***, 5.763***, 3.025*** and 1.031 for Models 3, 6, 9 and 12, respectively. The endogenous variables are instrumented using: Competitors, Market 
size, Novelty, Speed, Trademarks and their interactions with IOKA. 
“.” means the corresponding variable was dropped from estimation because of collinearity. The collinearity occurred because in the estimation I used the dummy form of 
Publication Stock (1 if is above the sample median, and 0 if otherwise). When I use the continuous form of Publication Stock, the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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Table 3.8b Split sample regressions with R&D Stock as Absorptive Capacity and IOKA as the stock of backward self-citations divided by 
the stock of patents. Dependent variable Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
Low AC  High AC  Centralized  Decentralized 
RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM 


















 (0.090) (0.092) (0.270)  (0.035) (0.036) (0.067)  (0.069) (0.093) (0.169)  (0.047) (0.052) (0.113) 
Licensing 0.096
**




 0.033 -0.006 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.209)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.118)  (0.098) (0.110) (0.194)  (0.028) (0.029) (0.135) 







 (0.341) (0.395) (0.405)  (0.284) (0.309) (0.374)  (0.405) (0.421) (0.423)  (0.272) (0.315) (0.446) 
R&D Stock . . .  . . .  -0.045 -0.079 -0.141  0.053 0.064 0.108 
         (0.309) (0.322) (0.287)  (0.170) (0.146) (0.149) 
Decentralization 0.015 0.020 -0.397
*
  -0.059 -0.040 -0.023  . . .  . . . 















  -0.095 -0.102 -0.086 
 (0.131) (0.216) (0.195)  (0.062) (0.060) (0.071)  (0.106) (0.243) (0.326)  (0.073) (0.080) (0.073) 




  0.097 0.029 0.013 
 (0.080) (0.169) (0.199)  (0.054) (0.040) (0.049)  (0.097) (0.409) (0.286)  (0.060) (0.062) (0.067) 
Firm Size 1.255
***




 0.043  0.891
***







 (0.211) (0.395) (0.749)  (0.095) (0.177) (0.262)  (0.199) (0.240) (0.565)  (0.110) (0.153) (0.182) 
North America -0.081    0.343    0.322    -0.110   
 (0.402)    (0.605)    (0.482)    (0.245)   
Europe 0.521    0.671    -0.386    0.491   
 (0.553)    (0.652)    (0.621)    (0.333)   
Obs. 283 283 283  390 390 390  237 237 237  436 436 436 
Num. Clusters 64 64 64  58 58 58  51 51 51  78 78 78 
R-Squared 0.638 0.290   0.766 0.285   0.835 0.208   0.833 0.548  
Hansen test   6.224    3.224    5.608    5.828 
Hansen p-value   0.514    0.780    0.586    0.560 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
IOKA is defined as the stock of backward self-citations divided by the stock of patents.  
Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted.  
The F-stats of the first stage for Licensing are 2.167**, 4.449***, 2.353** and 1.072 for Models 3, 6, 9 and 12, respectively. The endogenous variables are instrumented using: Competitors, Market size, 
Novelty, Speed, Trademarks and their interactions with IOKA. 
“.” means the corresponding variable was dropped from estimation because of collinearity. The collinearity occurred because in the estimation I used the dummy form of R&D 




Table 3.8c Split sample regressions with Scientific References Stock as Absorptive Capacity and IOKA as the stock of backward self-
citations divided by the stock of patents. Dependent variable Ln(1+MarketCapitalization)t 
Low AC  High AC  Centralized  Decentralized 
RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM RE FE GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 















 (0.095) (0.098) (0.336)  (0.067) (0.073) (0.088)  (0.068) (0.079) (0.153)  (0.047) (0.051) (0.110) 
Licensing 0.073
**
 0.034 0.288  0.103 0.120
*




 0.032 -0.018 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.180)  (0.072) (0.071) (0.176)  (0.091) (0.104) (0.140)  (0.027) (0.029) (0.145) 
IOKA 0.647
*
 0.451 0.442  0.595 1.095
**







 (0.373) (0.397) (0.579)  (0.427) (0.450) (0.405)  (0.382) (0.391) (0.326)  (0.279) (0.321) (0.442) 
Scientific References  . . .  . . .  0.352 0.396 0.816
***
  -0.062 -0.099 -0.119 
        (0.297) (0.304) (0.211)  (0.173) (0.159) (0.148) 
Decentralization 0.072 0.082 0.110  -0.155 -0.185 -0.170  . . .  . . . 
 (0.126) (0.144) (0.137)  (0.156) (0.160) (0.123)         
Patent 0.246 0.291 0.450
**
  -0.059 -0.145 -0.128  0.130 0.124 0.617
**
  -0.087 -0.087 -0.054 
 (0.180) (0.185) (0.186)  (0.073) (0.091) (0.115)  (0.129) (0.257) (0.265)  (0.080) (0.082) (0.079) 
Publication 0.108 0.014 -0.098  0.151
**






  0.097 0.028 0.006 




















 (0.125) (0.173) (0.185)  (0.127) (0.270) (0.473)  (0.208) (0.249) (0.463)  (0.106) (0.159) (0.211) 
North America -0.165    0.038    0.411    -0.117   
 (0.299)    (0.350)    (0.529)    (0.249)   
Europe 0.823
*
    -0.135    -0.301    0.496   
 (0.427)    (0.621)    (0.633)    (0.340)   
Obs. 319 319 315  354 354 347  237 237 227  436 436 428 
Num. Clusters 57 57 53  57 57 50  51 51 41  78 78 70 
R-Squared 0.680 0.089   0.793 0.224   0.833 0.137   0.832 0.543  
Hansen test   12.900    3.266    6.383    5.966 
Hansen p-value   0.075    0.659    0.496    0.544 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Stars represent the following significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
IOKA is defined as the stock of backward self-citations divided by the stock of patents.  
Independent variables are at time t-1 and transformed using the natural logarithm, notation is omitted.  
The F-stats of the first stage for Licensing are 3.398***, 1.773, 2.972*** and 0.937 for Models 3, 6, 9 and 12, respectively. The endogenous variables are instrumented using: Competitors, Market size, 
Novelty, Speed, Trademarks and their interactions with IOKA. 
“.” means the corresponding variable was dropped from estimation because of collinearity. The collinearity occurred because in the estimation I used the dummy form of Scientific 




HOW RELIABLE IS THE MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The development of new technologies has become a process that involves 
multiple firms in multiple stages (Arora et al., 2001). According to the market for 
technology literature, firms can boost their innovative performance by combining 
different technological inputs acquired through several mechanisms such as licensing and 
acquisitions. Research on this topic has mostly focused on the supply of technology to the 
market, although a few recent papers have studied the role of the demand side (Arora et 
al., 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006) by focusing on the 
effect of external technologies on firm performance. However, in the context of interfirm 
collaboration, the importance of intellectual property management and the role of 
acquired patents in case of litigation have been greatly overlooked. In particular, existing 
research has disregarded the significance and the reliance of acquired technologies after a 
final innovation is commercialized. We aim to reduce this gap by analyzing the strength 
of acquired patents when challenged in court litigations. This research helps increase our 
understanding of the role of the markets for technology and the ability of acquired patents 
to protect the stability of downstream revenues. 
The ability to manage intellectual property rights is increasingly becoming an 
important aspect of corporate strategy, and this effect is emphasized for technological 
firms that exploit patents to gain competitive advantage (Rivette and Kline, 2000). 
Patents are an important factor to protect and stimulate innovative research as well as its 
development, and this is even more significant in the pharmaceutical industry than in 
91 
 
other sectors (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987). As such, firms can exploit 
technology acquisitions to boost productivity, but once a downstream product is 
commercialized, its protection is limited by the uncertainty of patent litigations. Patents 
grant the right to exclude someone from commercializing an invention; this privilege is 
conditional, however, on the uncertainty related to litigation outcomes (Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2005). 
We argue that, in case of litigation, patents acquired through the markets for 
technology may differ from those developed internally for various reasons. First, 
technology buyers investigate the quality of the acquired technology through the due 
diligence procedure and select the best technologies available on the market. This 
selection process should favor the acquisition of patents that are better than those 
developed internally because internal patents are not screened through the due diligence 
procedure. Second, companies that specialize as technology suppliers may have superior 
legal capabilities to provide higher quality patents, thereby increasing the quality of the 
supplied technology. However, the counterargument may be true as well; for example, it 
is possible that external patents are developed by a technology supplier with inferior legal 
capabilities (e.g., small companies with inferior capabilities), thus increasing the chances 
of a lower quality patent. As a result, uncertainty still exists as to whether acquired 
patents are able to protect future revenues in case of litigation and whether they differ 
from technologies produced within the firm’s boundaries. 
If we combine the idea of litigation uncertainty with the fact that firms pay a 
patent premium to increase the value of their innovation (Arora et al., 2008), it is 
strategically important to understand the differences between acquired and internally 
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developed patents. In particular, the level of protection may differ between internal and 
external patents to such a degree that it may increase or decrease the probability of 
winning patent litigations and, in turn, the stability of the incumbent revenues. The 
consequences of patent litigation are important since the profitability of a product is 
limited by the potential entry of other competitors. If the litigation is not successful and 
patents are not reliable, patent holders can suffer from significant revenue losses. Due to 
the uncertainty that characterizes the development process and the substantial 
investments required, patents are an essential factor to recover R&D expenditures 
through future revenues (Cohen et al., 2000). It follows that if external patents are less 
reliable than internal ones, investments in external technologies may undermine future 
revenues and, as a result, generate negative profits that reduce the incentives to innovate.  
Our research contributes to both the markets for technology and patent litigation 
literature. We provide evidence that external patents are more likely to successfully 
protect a product than patents developed within the firm’s boundaries. Our results extend 
the known benefits associated with the markets for technology in boosting innovative 
performance, and they integrate prior research by offering a new perspective on the role 
of acquired technologies. Companies can take advantage of external technologies as a 
defensive strategy to reduce market entry and competition, a result which is in line with 
that described by Cohen et al. (2000). To our knowledge, this is the first paper that 
separates and analyzes the effects of internal and external patents on both the probability 
of litigation and the final outcome. 
We directed our research questions toward the pharmaceutical industry and the 
entry of generic manufacturers through the Paragraph IV challenges. Under the U.S. 
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legislative system, branded firms are granted five years of market protection that runs in 
parallel with patent protection. After the expiration of the market exclusivity period, 
generic manufacturers can apply for a Paragraph IV certification and challenge the 
validity of patents owned by the branded company before its expiration. Generic 
manufacturers can commercialize their product if they meet one of two conditions: either 
the generic drug does not infringe on patents held by the branded company or the 
litigated patents are considered invalid. We argue that Paragraph IV challenges provide a 
natural setting for our research because they are stochastic events with a binary outcome 
in that a branded company can either preserve their monopolistic position or lose it in 
favor of generic manufacturers. This setting offers the possibility to compare internal and 
external patents as well as their ability to successfully defend the incumbent position in 
the case of intellectual property lawsuits. 
Methodologically, our analysis is divided into two steps. First, we estimate the 
probability of a company being the target of a Paragraph IV challenge. We focus on both 
drug and patent level data to analyze the characteristics that influence the decision to 
challenge a specific drug or patent. Our results show that more profitable drugs have a 
higher probability of being attacked, thus offering support for existing literature 
(Grabowski and Kyle, 2007; Higgins and Graham, 2009). However, we do not find 
differences between internal and external patents on the hazard of being challenged.   
Second, we analyze the litigation outcomes of the companies under the Paragraph 
IV challenge and the likelihood that generic manufacturers win the challenge. We find 
that acquired technologies reduce the possibility of market entry. In our data, we were 
unable to identify the method of procurement of the external patents (e.g., licensing or 
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acquisition); therefore, we classified a patent as external if the company that developed 
the technology was different from the company that commercialized it. An examination 
of the litigation outcomes and the effects of external patents lead us to suggest that the 
due diligence process effectively selects stronger external patents that allow branded 
firms to maintain their incumbent position.  
 
4.2. Literature review 
4.2.1. The role of external technologies 
In the last few decades, the importance of external technologies in boosting 
innovative activity has grown dramatically, and an extensive stream of literature has 
developed focusing on the role played by technology acquisitions (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 
2006; Arora et al., 2001; Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Chesbrough, 2003; Gambardella 
et al., 2007; Gans et al., 2002; Teece, 1986). In many industries, firms utilize and build 
on external innovation to maintain their competitive market position, suggesting that 
markets for technology are a key component of a firm’s innovative effort. For instance, 
Scherer (2010) shows that a larger proportion of revenues for pharmaceutical companies 
is derived from products discovered outside of the firm. Similarly, Ceccagnoli et al. 
(2010) support this finding in their sample of new drugs introduced into the market: 
almost half of the patents linked to new products were developed outside the firm. In 
addition to these findings, products developed through technologies licensed from a 
biotechnology company tend to have a greater probability of success (Arora and 
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Danzon et al., 2005). It follows that the role played by external 
technologies is crucial for the pharmaceutical industry. 
95 
 
Acquired technologies are also important in creating benefits in terms of R&D 
productivity (Arora et al., 2001). Existing literature tends to converge toward a 
complementary relationship between internal R&D and external technology acquisitions. 
Firms with higher levels of internal knowledge are more actively involved in external 
agreements (Arora and Gambardella, 1990). Similarly, the absorptive capacity of 
technology buyers is positively related to technology acquisitions (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006). More recently, Ceccagnoli et al. (2011)  demonstrate that R&D 
productivity increases when internal investments and external technologies are combined. 
These studies emphasize the role of markets for technology from a demand-side 
perspective, suggesting that licensed technologies generate positive synergies when 
combined with internal knowledge. 
Another benefit of technology acquisitions is related to knowledge spillovers. 
Through external technologies, firms are able to access knowledge and capabilities that 
they were lacking. Technology transfers are knowledge flows between the parties 
involved (Griliches, 1992). Companies can benefit from the know-how transferred from 
the acquisition by integrating it into the internal knowledge. 
Despite the positive effects related to external technologies, there are some 
obstacles that may affect a company's ability to realize the payoffs generated by 
technology acquisition. First, contractual uncertainties can undermine the supply of 
technologies: uncertainty and opportunistic behavior increase transaction costs, reducing 
technology transfer (Williamson, 1985). Second, the level of tacit knowledge may reduce 
the positive spillovers generated by the transfer. In fact, when knowledge is difficult to 
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transfer, the incentive to acquire external technologies is reduced (Kogut and Zander, 
1993). 
Existing research has extensively focused on either the role of external patents in 
boosting a firm’s innovative effort or on the determinants and conditions that facilitate 
technology transfers. However, there is no clear result of the reliability of acquired 
technologies. We question whether firms are able to appropriate the returns generated by 
external technologies once embedded in commercialized products. After a product is 
introduced into the market, is there any difference if it relies on internally or externally 
developed technologies? How is competition affected by the reliability of external 
patents? In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, one can argue that, relative to internal 
patents, external technologies may be of lower quality because biotechnology firms have 
fewer resources and capabilities to develop a stronger and more enforceable patent. 
However, since pharmaceutical companies perform a due-diligence examination of 
external patents, the counter explanation would suggest that only technologies with 
stronger patent protection are selected by the buyer.  
 
4.2.2. Patent Litigation 
The market for technology literature emphasizes the benefits of technological 
acquisitions; however, under the pressure of competitive environments and new entrants, 
the value of acquired technologies can be affected by the scope of patent protection. In 
the case of litigation, patents play a crucial role in defending the value of the technology. 
Previous analyses on optimal patent policy have usually assumed that there is no 
uncertainty about the scope of patent protection (Gallini, 1984; Gallini and Winter, 
1985), but a more recent perspective recognizes that patent protection is imperfect until it 
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successfully survives a challenge in court (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005; Shapiro, 2003). As 
Lemley and Shapiro (2005) explain, the strength of patents is linked to the examination 
process; in general, the structure of patent review favors the approval of weak patents. As 
a result, almost half of the challenged patents are found invalid when litigated. For this 
reason, patents have been defined as probabilistic since they do not confer an absolute 
right to exclude imitators, instead conferring the right to try to exclude them through 
litigation (Hemphill and Sampat, 2011; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).   
In our context, pharmaceutical companies can exploit external technologies to 
better protect their R&D investments. According to Katz and Shapiro (1987), stronger 
patents make licensing more feasible and create disincentives for imitation. The argument 
behind this logic is that, conditional on a successful development, it may be easier to 
appropriate the economic rewards of a technology if its patent was held in the early 
stages. If acquired technologies are more reliable than those developed internally and 
under a regime of strong patents, pharmaceutical firms may reduce the litigation 
uncertainty and increase their ability to appropriate the monetary effect of innovation. 
Another reason why external patents may be important in the litigation process is 
based on the opportunity to create complementarities in the patent portfolio. Portfolios of 
complementary patents can be used as a mechanism to discourage litigation. For 
example, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) identify patent portfolio and owner size as 
possible factors that determine patent litigation. Their findings show that having a larger 
portfolio reduces the probability of having a lawsuit filed. The authors conclude that there 
are enforcement spillovers within a given firm. From this perspective, extensive patenting 
can lower litigation rates and costs, and promote settlements and patent trades between 
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the parties involved. Similarly, Bessen and Meurer (2005) analyze patent litigation in the 
1980s and 1990s. They identify three reasons why previous work on patent litigation and 
effectiveness may be misleading: first, patent rates and litigation may be jointly 
determined; second, effective patent lives may vary across groups; and lastly, the existing 
literature has focused on litigation as a patent enforcement mechanism and not as a 
defensive strategy against infringement suits. The effect of patent portfolios as evidenced 
by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) is comparable to what Bessen and Meurer (2005) 
define as the defensive patenting hypothesis: firms with large portfolios are less likely to 
sue each other. Finally, Allison and Lemley (1998) focus on patent validity  by collecting 
data on patent and legislation characteristics. They conclude that issued patents have only 
a slightly higher probability to be valid, and that there is no difference in the likelihood of 
being invalid between industries.   
A different area of research focuses specifically on the determinant of patent 
settlements. Patent strategies have made litigation unavoidable and, as a result, 
companies are facing increasing enforcement costs. In fact, since a single product can 
infringe multiple patents, the number of licenses needed to resolve the disputes has 
increased. Companies are facing a “patent thicket,” requiring them to obtain multiple 
licensed technologies to commercialize their products (Shapiro, 2001), and are facing a 
greater risk of litigation. To reduce their enforcement costs, firms can avoid litigation 
lawsuits by defining settlement agreements on the application of their property rights. 
Theoretical models have demonstrated how repeated interactions (Allison et al., 2010), 
suits with negative expected value (Bebchuk, 1987) and imperfect information (Bebchuk, 
1984) favor patent settlement. However, even if the parties involved can voluntarily settle 
99 
 
without ending in a lawsuit, the threat of litigation costs can influence the settlement 
terms and, ultimately, the R&D incentive to develop or acquire new technologies 
(Hemphill, 2006). Moreover, experienced firms may produce higher quality patents, that 
gives rise to fewer disputes and lower litigation uncertainty (Graham et al., 2003).  
 
4.3. Pharmaceutical industry and regulatory description 
4.3.1. The Pharmaceutical industry 
I test the robustness of the second and third hypotheses in Table 3.6a and Table 
3.6b (in Chapter 3 Appendix). The former includes the stock of R&D as a measure of 
absorptive capacity, while the latter includes the stock of scientific references. Similarly 
to Table 3.4, I present the benchmark regressions estimated on the split samples. The 
results show that the lack of absorptive capacity and the restrictions imposed by a 
centralized organizational structure emphasize the substitutability between internal 
knowledge and licensed technologies. 
The pharmaceutical industry provides a perfect setting for our analysis. Because 
of the U.S. regulatory environment, generic manufacturers can litigate the patents of a 
branded drug before they expire and undermine the incumbent position of branded 
companies. Although there is extant literature on generic entry (Grabowski and Kyle, 
2007; Reiffen and Ward, 2005; Scott Morton, 2000), there is still little attention on patent 
challenges and their implications for market entry and competition. A recent stream of 
research has discussed patent challenges and their role in affecting the length of market 
protection (Grabowski, 2004; Grabowski and Kyle, 2007; Hemphill and Sampat, 2011). 
An increasing number of drugs are challenged by generic manufacturers, and drugs with 
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larger sales attract more competitors (Grabowski and Kyle, 2007; Hemphill and Sampat, 
2011; Scott Morton, 1999). A recent paper by Berndt et al. (2007) finds similar results on 
the increasing rate of Paragraph IV certifications. Despite the focus on the impact of 
authorized generics, which reduces the incentive for entry by new firms, the authors 
conclude that the number of Paragraph IV challenges remains very high. In addition, this 
stream of literature suggests that generic challenges are driven by branded drug sales and 
that, as a consequence of this increase in competition, branded companies face increased 
uncertainty on returns appropriability as well as a reduction of their R&D incentives. 
While results converge toward the role played by sales as the primary incentive for 
generic entry, there is little evidence on the role played by patents and their 
characteristics in the pre-entry decision and lawsuit outcome. 
By combining insights from the existing literature on markets for technology and 
patent litigation, we analyze the reliability of acquired patents to protect existing 
products. The literature on markets for technology and patent litigation has discussed the 
implication of patents on performance and value appropriability. However, they lack the 
ability to determine if external technologies are more reliable compared to those 
developed internally. Similarly, existing literature on the pharmaceutical industry has not 
focused on the role of external patents in court litigations and their use as a defensive 
mechanism adopted by branded firms to delay market entry by competitors. Several 
empirical papers have studied generic competition and entry without focusing on the pre-
entry decisions (Grabowski and Kyle, 2007; Scott Morton, 1999, 2000). This literature 
provides important insights on generic entry and its determinants, which include 
advertising, market size and competition intensity. A recent paper by Hemphill and 
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Sampat (2011) is the first attempt to our knowledge that links generic patent litigations to 
patent characteristics. The authors find that, conditional on sales and drug characteristics, 
weaker patents, defined by citations and family size, are more likely to facilitate 
Paragraph IV challenges. Therefore, the combination of patents that protect a branded 
drug may matter in extending the drug’s market life. Our intent is to understand under 
which conditions external patents are challenged by competitors and which patent 
characteristics can protect the innovation. 
 
4.3.2. The regulatory environment 
4.3.2.1. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
In the pharmaceutical industry, drug protection was regulated in 1984 with the 
introduction of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known 
as the Hatch-Waxman Act. The act was introduced with the intent to establish a balance 
between innovative pharmaceutical research and access to generic drugs, but it failed to 
do so. Pharmaceutical companies that seek to market a new chemical-based drug are 
required to file a New Drug Application (NDA) to the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).
19
 The filing process forces pharmaceutical companies to list safety information 
and effectiveness of the new product. Once a drug is approved, pharmaceutical firms are 
required to list materially relevant patents in protection of the NDA.
20
 The selected 
patents are listed in the FDA Orange Book, and they define the scope of protection of the 
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 We focus only on chemical-based (non-biological) drugs. Biological drugs are medical products such as 
vaccines, blood or blood components. They require a Biologics License Application (BLA) and they are 
approved by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research of the FDA. 
20
 The FDA Orange Book Preface states the following: “The patents that FDA regards as covered by the 
statutory provisions for submission of patent information are:  patents that claim the active ingredient(s); 
drug product patents which include formulation/composition patents; use patents for a particular approved 
indication or method of using the product; and certain other patents as detailed on FDA Form 3542.” 
Available at: http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm 
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new drug. Only the patents listed in the Orange Book can be used to protect the drug in 
case of litigation.  
Since the FDA has not precisely defined “materially relevant” innovations and it 
has not controlled the selection of the listed documents, branded companies enjoy a 
certain level of freedom in selecting the patent to list in the Orange Book. In addition to 
patent protection, pharmaceutical companies have historically relied on the ownership of 
clinical trial results. However, changes in the legal framework and changes in the 
interpretation of the law by the U.S. courts are affecting patent protection standards and 
clinical data protection (Knowles, 2010). Therefore, it is important to understand the 
evolution of the legal environment and how it affects branded companies and generic 
manufacturers. 
In favor of pharmaceutical companies, the Hatch-Waxman Act introduced data 
exclusively for branded drugs in parallel to patent protection. Data exclusivity is the 
exclusive marketing right granted upon approval, and it can run concurrently with a 
patent or not. It protects the ownership of preclinical and clinical trial data. Exclusivity 
grants differ on protection periods, based on the type of NDA that is approved. Most 
drugs are approved as new chemical entities and receive 5 years of protection, although 
orphan drugs are granted 7 years and pediatric drugs are granted an extra 6 months for 
exclusivity.  
 The objective of data exclusivity protection is to facilitate the recovery of R&D 
investments by pharmaceutical companies. In particular, data exclusivity tends to favor 
new chemical entities with short-term patent protection or none at all. Moreover, the 
approval process for generic drugs averages about 30 months and the effective protection 
103 
 
is about 7 years. The data exclusivity period is inadequate because of the rising R&D 
costs; in fact, the average R&D cost of a new branded drug exceeded $800 million in 
2000 (DiMasi et al., 2003). Most of the drugs are not able to recoup the entire R&D 
investment during the exclusivity period, thus reducing the incentive to invest in R&D 
(Grabowski and Kyle, 2007). After generic drugs enter the market, the market share of 
branded drugs decreases drastically (Higgins and Graham, 2009), thereby reducing the 
ability for branded firms to recover their investments. Over the past 25 years, generic 
products have gone from representing 20% of drug prescriptions to now representing 
70% of them (Engelberg et al., 2009). According to Higgins and Graham (2009), 
aggressive generic competition may result in fewer innovator profits and less incentive to 
innovate. To reestablish a balance between innovative process and generic access, 
Knowles (2010) suggests increasing data exclusivity to 14 years to facilitate the recovery 
of R&D expenditures and to incentivize future investments. 
The second intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to facilitate generic entry. 
Under this legislative system, the FDA can approve a new generic drug through an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). To be approved, generic manufacturers 
have to demonstrate that their product is bioequivalent to a referenced NDA’s brand-
name product, which implies that the generic drug has the same active ingredients, 
dosage form and strength as the NDA. The Hatch-Waxman Act also allows generic 
manufacturers to use the patents listed in the Orange Book to develop the generic version 
of the drug before patent expiration. 
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 “Paragraph I certification” pertains to drugs listed in the Orange Book, but 
without an accompanying patent. The FDA may approve the ANDA 
immediately.  
 “Paragraph II certification” refers to drugs with one or more expired patents. 
The FDA may approve the ANDA immediately.  
 “Paragraph III certification” indicates that generic manufacturers seek 
approval after the challenged patents have expired. The FDA may approve the 
ANDA only after such patents expire. 
 “Paragraph IV certification” certifies that the listed patents are either invalid 
or will not be infringed on by the generic drug. ANDA approval is conditional 
on the Paragraph IV certification outcome. 
The process related to Paragraph IV certification is not linear; indeed, it is 
conditioned by several strategic decisions. The process starts with the Paragraph IV 
certification request by a generic manufacturer. Paragraph IV applicants are required to 
list and identify all the patents they want to challenge. As part of the certification, the 
ANDA filer must notify the patent holder about the certification request and submit a 
detailed statement of the legal basis by which the generic product does not infringe on the 
listed patents or a statement detailing why the patents are invalid. A generic product may 
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 In this paper we only focus on Paragraph IV certifications because they challenge the ongoing patent 
protection. Paragraph IV challenges can be seen as a test of the validity and strength of the patents that 
protect a branded drug. Other certifications reflect a less competitive choice: under Paragraph I and II, 
patent protection has already expired therefore new competitors can directly enter the market. Generic 
manufacturers apply for Paragraph III certifications when patent protection is still active, however the 
generic version of the drug can be commercialized only after patent protection has expired. 
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not infringe on the patent if the manufacturer has discovered a way to produce a 
bioequivalent drug through a different process, has discovered a different structure of the 
same active ingredient, or has adopted a different delivery mechanism. Alternatively, a 
patent may be considered invalid if it was wrongfully granted or was anticipated by prior 
art, or if the invention was in public use for more than 1 year before the USPTO 
application (Herman, 2011). 
After such notice, the patent holder has the option to sue the ANDA filer for 
infringement within 45 days from the notification. Once the branded company is notified, 
if a lawsuit is not filed, the FDA can approve the ANDA, and the generic manufacturer 
may enter the market. In case of infringement, an automatic 30 months' protection is 
awarded to pharmaceutical companies. During this period, the FDA can only approve the 
ANDA if there is a court determination of non-infringement, the patent is declared 
invalid or the patent expires. Conversely, if the lawsuit outcome enforces the patent 
holder’s rights, then generic manufacturers cannot market their products.  
When an ANDA filer wins the infringement lawsuit, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
awards a 180-day exclusivity right to the first Paragraph IV applicant. Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the definition of first applicant is based on a patent-by-patent system. 
Therefore, there may be multiple first ANDA filers if they successfully challenge 
different patents listed in the Orange Book for the same drug. This creates overlapping 
exclusivity periods called mutual blocking exclusivity. As a result, multiple generic 
manufacturers may receive the 180-day exclusivity and no one can launch the new 
product until all overlapping exclusivity periods expire. It has been estimated that the 
180-day exclusivity period generates potential revenues of approximately $60 million 
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(Higgins and Graham, 2009). The costs of challenging are only about $5 million. Clearly, 
the positive payoff of filing litigation generates high incentives for generic firms to enter 
the market, thus creating a successful strategy for competing against branded drugs. 
Figure 4.1 (in Chapter 4 Appendix) summarizes the Paragraph IV certification process. 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, pharmaceutical companies have developed a 
peculiar strategy to delay the Paragraph IV outcome by “evergreening,” or “stacking” up 
several 30-month periods (Bulow, 2004). Once litigations are already in progress, 
pharmaceutical firms are able to list new patents in the Orange Book and effectively 
restart the 30-month period. In fact, these new patents typically include weak patents that 
could have been used to sue the ANDA filer for infringement, thereby automatically 
restarting the 30-month period that prevents generic approval. This strategy is significant 
in increasing the litigation costs for a Paragraph IV applicant.  
To postpone generic entry, another common strategy developed by branded 
companies is to settle the infringement before a court decision. Such an alternative 
strategy involves pharmaceutical companies and future competitors that are seeking to 
market a generic version of the same drug. Settlements may favor both the branded 
company and the generic manufacturer: pharmaceuticals can maintain their patent-related 
monopoly, while generics may receive payments for agreeing to end the patent dispute. 
In short, pharmaceutical firms can settle patent litigations by paying potential competitors 
to abandon suits that, if successful, would have ruled in favor of the competition. This is 
advantageous to them because, if the generic manufacturer wins, it can enter the market 
prior to patent expiration and reduce the market power of pharmaceutical incumbents.  
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This “pay-for-delay” strategy in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry is very common 
(Bulow, 2004; Hemphill, 2006). Greater research effort and patenting experience can 
reduce litigation costs and speed up a possible settlement between parties: pharmaceutical 
firms may be able to anticipate the lawsuit outcome and determine whether to settle or 
not and under what conditions. However, the pay-for-delay settlements have raised 
antitrust concerns because they may limit competition and access to generic drugs. 
According to a recent study by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, pay-for-delay 




4.3.2.2.The Medicare Act of 2003 
In 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
(MMA) altered the regulatory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The MMA 
introduced two significant changes. First, it reformed the attribution of the 180-day 
exclusivity period; only the actual first applicant can receive the 180-day exclusivity for a 
given drug. This represents a drastic change compared to the previous framework. The 
shift from a patent-by-patent system to a product-based exclusivity was introduced to 
avoid mutual blocking exclusivities and to increase the economic incentive of the first 
ANDA applicant. The new regulation allows for shared exclusivity in case multiple 
Paragraph IV applicants submit ANDAs to the same drug on the same first day.  
Second, the new legal framework introduced a limit of only one 30-month stay 
period per challenger, thereby limiting the ability of pharmaceutical companies to extend 
the litigation and increase its cost. As noted by Bulow (2004), pharmaceutical companies 
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 Federal Trade Commission, “How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions” (2010) 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (last accessed: 08/13/2013) 
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are still listing new patents in the Orange Book because, although they cannot be used to 
extend the 30-month period, they can still be used in subsequent challenges. Both 
changes introduced by the MMA shape a new legal system that moves in favor of generic 
manufacturers. In fact, ANDA filers may use their Paragraph IV applications to exercise, 
if successful, their exclusivity right as the first applicant, which will allow them to exploit 
lower litigation costs and briefer lawsuit timeframes through the restriction of the 
evergreening strategy. 
 
4.3.2.3.The role of the U.S. Supreme Court 
As described by (Knowles, 2010), the regulation framework can be modified by 
both the U.S. Congress with the introduction of new laws and the courts with the 
application of them. Therefore, when there is a change in the interpretation of the law, 
patents that were considered valid may become invalid or vice versa. In the last 15 years, 
three court cases of particular importance have changed the legal regime that regulates 
Paragraph IV challenges and generic entry. The first case that influenced the regulatory 
system was the Mova v. Shalala case.
23
 Before this case, the FDA stated that only a 
generic applicant that had successfully defended against a patent litigation of the branded 
company could be awarded the 180-day exclusivity. In 1994, Mova filed a Paragraph IV 
certification for the generic version of Micronase, a diabetic drug marketed by 
Pharmacia. Pharmacia responded by suing Mova for infringement. In 1995, when Mylan 
applied for an ANDA on the same drug, however, Pharmacia declined to sue, and the 
FDA approved the Mylan generic product. The FDA justified its decision by sustaining 
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 Mova Pharmaceutical vs. Shalala (C.C. Cir. 1998). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCOURTS-
caDC-97-05082/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05082-0/content-detail.html (last accessed: 08/13/2013) 
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that Mova had not yet successfully defended its right against Pharmacia’s lawsuit. At this 
point, Mova sued the FDA to delay Mylan commercialization. In 1998, the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed Mova’s request to delay Mylan’s entry and, as a consequence, changed the legal 
requirement regarding the successful defense. The existing regulation was thus invalid. 
The FDA revoked the successful defense requirement from its guidance on generic 
approval. The importance of this case rests on the change of the 180-day exclusivity. The 
FDA cannot approve new generic versions of the focal drug until the exclusivity of the 
first applicant has expired. Generic companies now have more incentive to be the first 
Paragraph IV applicant to benefit from market exclusivity. If the first applicant loses the 
litigation case, however, under FDA regulation, it must convert its application to a 
Paragraph III challenge, deeming it ineligible for exclusivity. 
The second case changed the evaluation of patent nonobviousness. In 2007, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. affected whether a 
patent is considered nonobvious given the existing prior art.
24
 The context of this case is 
not related to the pharmaceutical industry; in fact, the case involves the innovation of 
placing a sensor on a fixed pivot point of an accelerator pedal of an automobile. While 
the adoption of sensors on automobile pedals was not new, the adoption of a pivot point 
was the real innovation in the patent owned by Teleflex. At first, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed the validity of the patent using the teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation test (TSM test). Under this test, a patent is proved obvious only 
if there is some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art that can be already 
found in said prior art or in the knowledge of a person with ordinary skill in the art. 
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 U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 04-1350. 




However, the U.S. Supreme Court revised the decision and decided the TSM test was too 
narrow and rigid. It concluded that an innovation can be obvious even if the prior art does 
not teach, suggest or motivate the innovation. The Supreme Court considered the Teleflex 
patent to be obvious and invalid. The Court then introduced a broader and vaguer 
definition of obviousness based on the use of common sense to one of ordinary skill in 
the art. With this broader standard, it should be easier for generic companies to prevail in 
Paragraph IV cases and to demonstrate that the challenged patent is invalid because the 
court did not specify the meaning of common sense. It is possible that patents related to 
different drug forms, dosages and methods of delivery may be more likely to be rejected 
and invalidated for obviousness. Chemical compounds often represent new 
advancements, drug formulations and delivery methods based on existing prior art, thus 
increasing the likelihood of being invalid. 
Finally, the last case involves MedImmune and Genentech. In 1997, MedImmune 
entered a licensing agreement with Genentech for two patents. One was already issued, 
while the second patent was a pending application on immunoglobulin host cells. After 
the agreement, MedImmune successfully commercialized a product called Synagis to 
treat respiratory disease in young children. By 1999, Synagis represented 80% of 
MedImmune revenues. In 2001, when the pending patent was granted, Genentech 
expected MedImmune to pay royalties for the new patent. However, MedImmune 
believed that Synagis did not infringe on the new patent, and that the same patent was 
invalid. Nevertheless, MedImmune continued to pay the royalties under protest, as the 
company did not want to risk losing its most valuable product. Instead, MedImmune 
brought a declaratory judgment action against Genentech, seeking to invalidate the new 
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patent. There are two different legislative aspects to consider in this case. First, the Lear 
doctrine (or Licensee estoppel)
25
 states that a patent licensee can challenge the validity of 
a licensed patent only if it refuses to pay royalties. Second, the declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction gives federal courts the authority to declare a party’s rights to a case or 
controversy. At the beginning of 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision 
made by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to dismiss the declaratory judgment 
MedImmune brought against Genentech, thus favoring MedImmune and changing the 
application of the declaratory judgment doctrine.
 26
 The implication of this decision is 
that a Paragraph IV applicant, if not sued, can bring a declaratory judgment action to 
reduce the uncertainty related by settlements. Rather than being at risk of future litigation 
suits, generic manufacturers may prefer a declaratory judgment to reduce the uncertainty 
regarding patent validity. As a result, there may be an increase in declaratory judgments 
when the branded company does not sue the ANDA filer. 
Given the dynamics of the legal environment, understanding the reliability of 
external patents becomes crucial to protecting the incumbent market position. DiMasi 
(2000) shows that almost 40% of the FDA-approved drugs from 1963 to 1999 were 
licensed and, since the introduction of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, generic 
challenges have drastically increased, which has generated a strong debate on the balance 
between drug innovation and access (Grabowski, 2004; Higgins and Graham, 2009). The 
thin balance between drug accessibility and innovation introduced by the Hatch-Waxman 
act has created concerns that early generic entry may diminish research incentives by 
reducing patent protection.  
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 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) 
26
 U.S. Supreme Court No. 05-608 http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-
608.pdf (last accessed: 08/13/2013) 
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4.4. Data description and methodology 
Our sample consists of all the new chemical entities approved by the FDA 
between 1995 and 2004 and the patents listed in the FDA Orange Book. Although we 
were able to gather data about drugs and patents from different sources extending to 
2010, we limited our analyses to drugs approved through 2004 to allow all our drugs to 
face the risk of being under the Paragraph IV challenge for at least 1 year. Our sample 
consists of 773 unique patents and includes 324 unique drugs approved by the FDA 
between 1995 and 2004.  
We matched the drugs and patents collected from the Orange Book to several data 
sources. First, litigation data was gathered from the proprietary dataset available at 
www.paragraphfour.com. The Paragraph IV report includes information on the number 
of Paragraph IV applicants, the products and patents that are being challenged, the status 
of pending court cases and the court decisions regarding the litigation. Then, we obtained 
data on sales and promotion expenditures from IMS MIDAS™. Finally, patent data such 
as the patent approval date, number of claims, citations, and type of patent were collected 
from Delphion™, IMS Patent Focus™ and the USPTO. We are able to identify if a 
patent was acquired or internally developed through the reassignment database of the 
USPTO. We compared the original patent assignee with the company that 
commercializes the focal drug; if the two were different, we defined that patent as 
externally developed. It is important to note that we are not able to identify the 
contractual agreement through which pharmaceutical companies acquired the external 
technology (e.g., licensing or acquisition). Descriptive statistics and correlations are 
provided in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, respectively (both in Chapter 4 Appendix). All 
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financial variables are converted into constant 2000 US dollars and foreign currencies are 
converted by using the average 12-month foreign currency divided by the US currency 
exchange rate. 
Our empirical approach is divided into two steps. First, we computed the hazard 
of a Paragraph IV challenge. We estimated our models both at the drug and the patent 
level of analysis to identify the characteristics that affect the decision to apply for a 
Paragraph IV certification. Second, conditional on being under Paragraph IV challenge, 
we focused on patent characteristics that may affect the litigation outcome in favor of 
generic manufacturers.  
This empirical approach presents several challenges due to multiple selection 
effects at work. First, branded companies are required to select which external 
technologies they will buy. Second, after a technology is acquired, there is a selection 
between which internal and external technologies they will use, followed by their 
inclusion in the FDA Orange book. Third, generic manufacturers can select which patent 
to challenge under the Paragraph IV application. All these effects may provide 
misleading and inaccurate estimates due to omitted variables that differ between treated 
and untreated groups (e.g., acquired vs. non-acquired patents, FDA-Orange-Book listed 
vs. non-listed patents, and Paragraph IV-challenged vs. non-challenged patents). 
To manage the selection introduced by the technology acquisition process, we 
estimated the demand for external technologies following Ceccagnoli et al. (2010) to 
define our selection equation and then included the Inverse Mills Ratio in our hazard 
model estimations. The Inverse Mills Ratio regards the selection of unobservable factors 
by estimating a bias correction through a choice model, which in our case is the decision 
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to acquire external technologies. Because the Inverse Mills Ratio is a nonlinear function 
of the variables included in the choice model, the main equation is identified even if the 
explanatory variables are identical in the two equations. However, the use of identical 
regressors posits identification problems because identification occurs on distributional 
assumptions (normality in the first-stage model) and is not based on variation in the 
independent variables. In this case, the estimate of the outcome equation may be 
imprecise. To solve this problem and make the source of identification clear, we follow 
Wooldridge (2002) and include two independent variables that appear only in the 
selection equation: R&D pipeline and promotion investments. The pipeline variable was 
collected from the Pharmaprojects database, and it includes compounds in development 
and approved drugs. Prior research has identified marketing capabilities as important co-
specialized assets in the pharmaceutical industry (Chan et al., 2007). We collected data 
on promotion investments from the IMS MIDAS™ database. 
The second selection effect cannot be controlled by the data available. The 
optimal setting requires linking internal and external patents to a specific drug and then 
estimating the determinants that would lead a patent to be included in the FDA Orange 
Book. It is impossible to precisely identify the relationship between patents and their 
application in the drug development process; in other words, we cannot attribute internal 
and external patents to a specific drug. 
Finally, the third selection should not affect our results as, on average, generic 
manufacturers challenge 85% of patents attached to a branded drug. This behavior should 
not be surprising since, by challenging multiple patents, the probability that at least one 
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challenged patent is either invalid or not infringed increases, which in turn increases 
generic producers’ likelihood of entering the market. 
 
4.4.1. Dependent variables 
Our data includes three dependent variables. The first variable identifies the 
Paragraph IV challenges at the drug level. We rely on data from 
www.paragraphfour.com to create a dummy that equals one for a drug that was 
challenged in a given year between 1999 and 2010, and zero otherwise. We are able to 
identify a total of 264 unique Paragraph IV challenges. Among our drugs, about 51% 
experience at least one Paragraph IV challenge, which provides a total of 165 NDAs. In 
Figure 4.2, there is clearly an increasing trend in the number of drugs challenged every 
year.  
We observe that only 33 drugs have been challenged from 1999 to 2003, while in 
the subsequent 5 years (2004-2008), this number increases to 132. In just the last 2 years, 
99 drugs were challenged. The horizontal lines represent the average number of 
challenges during three different periods. It is easy to identify the impact of legislative 
changes on the number of Paragraph IV applications. After the introduction of the MMA 
in 2003, generic manufacturers embraced Paragraph IV applications as a viable strategy 
to enter a market favored by lower litigation costs and incentivized by a new exclusivity 
regime. On average, the number of challenges per year increased to 26.4 in the period 
from 2004 to 2008, compared to 6.6 in the pre-2003 era. We also observe a shift in the 
number of drugs challenged after 2008. This increase may be related to the legislative 
changes introduced by the KSR and MedImmune cases, which favored generic 
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manufacturers. The average number of challenges (49.5 challenges) increases by 87% 









The second variable is a patent-level dummy that equals one if the ANDA filer 
challenges the focal patent in a given year and zero otherwise. On average, generic 
manufacturers challenge almost all patents listed in the FDA Orange Book per drug. In 
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data. As shown in Figure 4.3, the distribution of patents per number of Paragraph IV 
challenges is skewed toward zero. About 17% of our patents (131 patents) received at 









Among the 417 patents that received zero litigation, 349 patents are listed for 
drugs that did not receive any Paragraph IV challenges, while 68 were not challenged but 
listed under drugs that were litigated. Moreover, 41 of the 68 patents (about 60%) were 
externally developed, showcasing preliminary support of the idea that external patents 





























Our third dependent variable classifies the Paragraph IV lawsuit outcomes. We 
identify two potential scenarios: first, the court decides on the validity of the litigated 
patents, and second, the companies can privately settle for an agreement. In the latter 
case, we collected data from companies’ statements and SEC filings to identify the terms 
of the agreements. Finally, we categorized four different outcomes:  
1. The court rules in favor of the Paragraph IV applicant. One or more patents listed 
in the Orange book are considered either invalid or not infringed on by the generic 
product. It follows that the generic manufacturer can enter the market. 
2. The parties settle before reaching court trial. In contrast to the previous case, the 
agreement allows generic manufacturers to enter as an authorized generic. An 
authorized generic is a pharmaceutical product that was originally marketed and 
sold by a brand company, but is re-marketed under a generic product name. 
Generic companies may choose to partner with the brand company to launch an 
authorized generic in order to settle litigation or market a product they otherwise 
might not have been able to launch. We coded this outcome as favorable to 
generic manufacturers. 
3. The parties settle before reaching court trial. The agreement either delays or 
blocks generic entry. We coded this outcome as favorable to pharmaceutical 
companies. 
4. The court rules in favor of the pharmaceutical company. Patents listed in the 
Orange Book are considered either valid or infringed by the generic product; as a 
result, the generic manufacturer cannot enter the market. 
119 
 
To create the outcome dummy variable, we classify the first two cases as 
favorable to generic manufacturers while the last two cases support branded companies. 
Therefore, the Paragraph IV outcome dummy equals one in case of favorable outcomes 
for generic manufacturers and zero otherwise. On average, a favorable outcome for 
generic manufacturers occurs in about 47% of the cases and is almost equally divided 
between court decisions (63 occurrences) and settlement agreements (61 cases). 
 
4.4.2. Independent variables 
We adopt drug sales as one of our drug-level independent variables. Our intent is 
to study whether more profitable drugs influence the decision for entry by generic 
companies, since profitable segments attract more competitors. The existing literature has 
shown that more profitable drugs have a higher probability of being attacked (Grabowski 
and Kyle, 2007; Higgins and Graham, 2009). Similarly, Caves et al. (1991) find that 
market share is one of the determinants of generic entry. Upon entry, generic companies 
are able to erode pharmaceutical market share and overcome incumbents (Higgins and 
Graham, 2009).  
The number of external patents does not differ from those of internally developed 
patents; in fact, 383 patents in our sample (about 49%) represent external technologies. 
Additionally, only 41% of these patents (159 out of 383 external patents) are challenged, 
compared to 50% of the internal patents (197 out of 390 internal patents). The dummy 
takes a value of one if a patent was originally assigned to a different firm than the 
pharmaceutical company that commercializes the drug, and zero otherwise. With the data 
available, we are not able to identify the method of procurement (e.g., licensing or 
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acquisition); we can only track changes in patent assignees over time and compare the 
original assignee with the company that commercialized the branded drug.  
To control for different technologies, we include a set of dummies based on the 
type of patent. We rely on the data from the IMS Patent Focus™ database, which 
describes the function and use of focal patents. Each patent is categorized into one of the 
following groups: product patent, compound patent, method of use patent, drug delivery 
system and other types, including process patents. Based on this classification, we create 
five dichotomous variables. In our sample, about 21% of the patents are products and 
technologies, about 21% are classified as method of use patents, about 34% of the patents 
protect the drug composition, 14% are drug delivery system patents, and finally, 10% are 
classified as other patents. On average, we don’t find significant differences in the 
distribution of patent types between internal and external technologies. 
We also include four variables to control for patent characteristics. First, we 
collected data on both forward and backward citations. Forward citations are measured 
by accumulating the number of citations received by a patent from its grant year up to 
any given year and then representing the impact of the focal patent on subsequent 
innovations. Backward citations equal the number of existing patents cited. They denote 
how fundamental and innovative the patent is, since patents with many backward 
citations extensively build on existing knowledge and therefore may be less innovative. 
Among the challenged patents, external technologies have significantly fewer backward 
citations than those developed internally.
27
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 On average, external technologies have 14 backward citations while internal patents have 20. The 
difference is significant at the 10% level. 
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Second, we use the number of claims as a measure of patent quality (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004). The principal role of claims is to define the novel features of the 
invention and detail them to increase patent protection. We construct a variable that 
counts the total number of claims in all the patents in our sample; we do not find any 
significant differences between internal and external patents. 
Third, following Hemphill and Sampat (2011), we control for the hypotheses that 
late-expiring patents can add market life to the focal drug and that the timing of patenting 
may affect generic entry. We generated the new-patent dummy which takes a value of 
one if, within the patent portfolio for a single drug, the grant date of a patent is the latest. 
By doing so, we are able to trace from a temporal point of view which patents for a 
specific drug have been granted last. Particularly in the pharmaceutical industry, the 
timing of technology patenting does not necessarily coincide with its commercialization. 
Fourth, to control for differences in the lag between the FDA approval (beginning of 
market exclusivity) and the Paragraph IV challenge, we generate the extra time variable 
that equals the difference between the year of the challenge and the year in which the 
drug was approved. 
We also added a group of variables to control for drug characteristics. Our patent 
per innovation variable controls for the total number of patents attached to the focal NDA 
in the FDA’s Orange Book. By doing so, we take into consideration the different sizes of 
the patent portfolios for all our drugs. On average, drugs in our sample have four patents 
listed in the FDA Orange Book, while the largest drug portfolio has 18 patents attached. 
Companies may also have different incentives in protecting their products, based 
on several factors such as drug sales and drug promotion investments. We introduce two 
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drug importance variables. In particular, we control for the relative importance of the 
drug for the focal company. The sales variable equals drug sales divided by firm sales in 
any given year. One can imagine this variable to be the drug market share within the firm 
boundaries. We control for the drug’s relative importance because we assume that, if a 
Paragraph IV challenge occurs, pharmaceutical companies may be more likely to protect 
valuable drugs and limit generic entry. By the same token, the promotion variable is 
computed by dividing the promotion investments for the focal drug by the total firm 
promotion investments in any given year. Similar to the drug’s relative importance, 
pharmaceutical companies may be more likely to protect drugs whose relative sunk costs 
are higher. We assume that companies may protect more drugs that are well recognized 
in the market and that require large marketing investments. We include dummies to 
control for the therapeutic area of the focal drug (ATC).
28
 Combined, ATC J (Anti-
infective for systemic use) and ATC N (Nervous system) represent 15% of our sample; 
they are the largest ATCs. The third ATC is ATC A (Alimentary tract and metabolism), 
which represents about 11% of our drugs. 
Given the dramatic change introduced by the MMA, we also included a dummy 
variable that equals one for all the patents listed in the Orange Book after 2003. With the 
introduction of the new law, pharmaceutical companies cannot extend the duration of the 
litigation suit by listing new patents and stacking up multiple 30-month stay periods. In 
addition, the attribution of the 180-day exclusivity period is now on a drug-based system. 
                                                          
28 ATC stands for Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical, and its classes are defined by the World Health Organization 
(http://www.whocc.no/): A, Alimentary tract and metabolism; B, Blood and blood-forming organs; C, Cardiovascular 
system; D, Dermatological; G, Genitourinary system and sex hormones; H, 
Systemic hormonal preparations, excluding sex hormones and insulin; J, Anti-infective for systemic use; L, 
Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents; M, Musculoskeletal system; N, Nervous system; P, Antiparasitic 
products, insecticides and repellents; and R, Respiratory system. 
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As a consequence, there are more incentives for generic manufacturers to apply early for 
a Paragraph IV certification. 
Finally, we introduced a group of variables to control for Paragraph IV 
characteristics. We include the total number of Paragraph IV challengers. We argue that 
infringement litigations with multiple challengers are more expensive for branded 
companies. On average, and conditional on being attacked, a drug has two challengers, 
while the maximum number of generic manufacturers increases up to 15 for one drug. 
We also include a dummy to account for challenges that include Teva Pharmaceutical 
Industries (Teva dummy). Teva is the biggest generic company, boasting $16 billion in 
sales in 2010
29
, and it has been extremely active in Paragraph IV challenges. In fact, in 
our sample, Teva is among the challengers in about 25% percent of the Paragraph IV 
cases (66 cases out of 264). We build a dichotomous variable that equals one if Teva is 
among the first group of challengers in a Paragraph IV certification and zero otherwise.  
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Probability of receiving a Paragraph IV challenge 
4.5.1.1. Drug level estimations 
Our first set of analyses examines the determinants of the probability that a 
branded drug experience a Paragraph IV certification by a generic manufacturer. We 
estimate the hazard of a Paragraph IV challenge using a semi-parametric hazard model 
(Cox Model) to account for the correct censoring of the data. Due to the data-building 
process, the challenges we observe start from 1999 and continue until 2010. In Figure 4.4 
(in Chapter 4 Appendix), we report non-parametric estimations of the survival and hazard 
                                                          
29 http://www.tevapharm.com/en-US/About/Pages/AboutUs.aspx. (last accessed: 09/26/2011) 
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functions for all our drugs. We compare two groups based on the average drug sales and 
find preliminary support that sales drive the generic manufacturer's decision to file an 
ANDA. 
The estimated coefficients for different specifications are reported in Table 4.3 (in 
Chapter 4 Appendix). All our models include both therapeutic and fixed effects. Model 1 
includes only our control variables, while Model 2 introduces drug sales. The drug sales 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This result suggests that a higher level 
of sales increases the drug’s hazard of being challenged. In Model 3, we introduce the 
external patents variable. Its coefficient is statistically not significant in any of our 
specifications, suggesting that the number of external patents listed in the Orange Book 
does not affect the hazard of being challenged.  
In Models 4 and 5, we introduce several variables to control for patent 
characteristics. We include the percentage of patent types to account for differences in the 
composition of the patents attached to a single NDA. In order to control for patent 
quality, we include the number of claims, backward citations and forward citations 
received by the average patent attached to the focal drug. None of our variables have an 
effect in predicting the probability of a Paragraph IV challenge. We then introduce the 
percentage of patents listed in the Orange Book after the introduction of the MMA and 
find that these patents increase the hazard of being challenged. Finally, in Model 7, we 
discover that the patent-type variables positively affect the probability of a challenge 
when we don’t control for drug sales. We don’t find this result surprising, given that 
generic manufacturers tend to litigate most or all the patents listed in the Orange Book.
30
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 In our sample, generic manufacturers litigate an average of 85% of the patents listed in the Orange Book 
for a single drug. 
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These estimations have two major results: first, sales are the major factor in 
determining the hazard of Paragraph IV applications, and second, the patents listed after 
the introduction of the MMA in 2003 increase the chance of a challenge. Not 
surprisingly, sales have the strongest effect on the hazard of a challenge. These results 
support the existing literature, which posits that generic manufacturers enter markets with 
a higher expected value (Grabowski, 2004; Grabowski and Kyle, 2007; Hemphill and 
Sampat, 2011; Higgins and Graham, 2009; Scott Morton, 1999). As demonstrated by 
Higgins and Graham (2009), the first generic producer to enter the market is granted 180 
days of market exclusivity, which translates into $60 million in profits. Therefore, there is 
a larger incentive to attack and focus more on profitable drugs than on technology-
advanced ones. In addition, we find support for the idea that the MMA favors generic 
entry by reducing litigation costs, because drugs with a higher percentage of patents listed 
after 2003 experience a higher challenge hazard. It is possible that generic manufacturers 
are increasing their Paragraph IV challenges to exploit the exclusivity right assigned to 
the first challenger.  
 
4.5.1.2. Patent level estimations 
In our second set of analyses, we estimate the hazard of Paragraph IV challenges, 
but we use our data at the patent level. Analyzing patent-level data may introduce a 
selection effect bias, since companies tend to acquire only the “best” technologies 
available. Companies’ technology demands can be affected by factors such as 
complementary assets, technological productivity, technology generality, and firm size, 
among others (Ceccagnoli et al., 2010; Gambardella et al., 2007). We included the 
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Inverse Mills Ratio in our specifications to account for selection bias. However, we do 
not find strong statistical evidence of the selection choice. 
Our new estimations are reported in Table 4.4 (in Chapter 4 Appendix). Models 1 
to 6 report the estimations without interaction effects, while Models 7 to 12 include our 
patent characteristic variables interacted with the external patent dummy. Our linear 
regressions confirm the results we find in the Paragraph IV analyses at the drug level. In 
particular, we do not find different effects between external and internal patents. Patent-
type variables may increase the chance of a challenge when we don’t control for sales. 
We also confirm that sales drive most of the variance in explaining generic challenges. 
Finally, we find a positive effect of the introduction of the MMA, thus confirming that 
the reform reduces the litigation costs and favors generic entry (Models 5 and 6). 
Moreover, the effect of this act is significant for both internal and external patents 
(Models 10 to 12). Similarly to the drug-level analyses, these results confirm that the 
MMA has favored the increase of Paragraph IV challenges. Generic manufacturers have 
more incentive to be among the first applicants, since they would retain the exclusivity 
right; also, the limit of only one 30-month stay has lowered litigation costs. 
In addition, our results suggest that a higher number of claims increases the 
hazard of challenge. Since generic manufacturers seek to demonstrate that listed patents 
are invalid, a higher number of claims may indicate an “overclaiming” effect (Allison et 
al., 2010). It may be the case that the scope of listed patents is too broad; if so, the patents 
in question are more likely to be found invalid or not infringed. Finally, similar to 
Hemphill and Sampat (2011), higher numbers of patents per drug positively increase the 
likelihood of a challenge. 
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In Models 7 to 12, we interact patent variables with the external patent dummy in 
an attempt to identify possible differences in patent characteristics between internal and 
external patents. As described in previous estimations, patent-type variables are 
significant only if we do not include sales in the estimation. For these variables, we do 
not find a clear contraposition between internal and acquired patents; however, the 
increase in the hazard of challenge is driven by internal patents. 
A second interesting result confirms the possible effect of overclaiming. While we 
still find a positive effect in the hazard of a challenge, we also find that this effect is 
driven by external patents. When we interact the claims with the external patent dummy, 
we find a positive and significant coefficient, while the linear effect has no effect. This 
result suggests that external patents may use claims to overdefine the scope of 
protection.
31
 Generic manufacturers may exploit overclaiming patents to seek invalidity 
and/or be granted the ANDA approval. 
 
4.5.2. Paragraph IV outcomes 
After generic manufacturers decide to apply for a Paragraph IV challenge, the 
actual possibility of entering the market is defined by either a positive outcome of the 
litigation suit or a settlement with the pharmaceutical firm.
32
 It is important to understand 
the role of patents in determining the lawsuit outcome for each challenge. 
Our regressions are estimated using a semi-parametric Cox Hazard Model. Our 
hazard variable equals one if generic manufacturers are able to enter the market by either 
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 On average, external patents have three claims more than internal ones. The same result holds if we limit 
our test only to litigated patents. These differences are statistically significant, confirming the possibility of 
overclaiming for external patents. 
32
 Generic manufacturers can enter the market before the court ruling. However, generic producers must 
weigh the benefits and risks of an at-risk launch in order to minimize possible downstream risks in case the 
court rules in favor of the pharmaceutical company. 
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winning the litigation suit or signing an agreement with the branded company to become 
an authorized generic. The variable equals zero when the court rules in favor of branded 
companies, litigated patents are valid and/or infringed, or pharmaceutical companies 
adopt a pay-for-delay strategy (Hemphill, 2006). To account for the reliance on external 
technologies, we include the Inverse Mills Ratio, estimated from the technology demand 
equation; however, we still do not find a significant effect. Table 4.5 (in Chapter 4 
Appendix) reports the estimated coefficient of our Paragraph IV outcome regressions. 
As in the previous section, Models 1 to 5 report the linear effects of our measures 
while Models 6 to 10 include the interacted variables with the external patent dummy. 
Our main variable of interest, external patent, has a negative effect on the hazard of 
generic wins in all our linear models in Table 4.5. This result confirms the possibility that 
acquired technologies may be more reliable than those developed internally. On average, 
external patents are less likely to favor generic entry through a Paragraph IV certification. 
We are unable to find the same effect when we introduce our interaction variables. One 
can imagine that external patents are more reliable because they represent the “best” 
patents available to protect the innovation. Based on previous studies on markets for 
technology, pharmaceutical companies use internal and external patents to boost their 
innovative productivity (Arora et al., 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Ceccagnoli et 
al., 2011; Chesbrough, 2003). However, among the entire pool of patents used to develop 
a new drug, pharmaceutical companies select only a few to be listed in the Orange Book. 
Based on this process, firms should select those patents that guarantee the highest level of 
protection. Although we control for the possible selection induced by the company’s 
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technological demand, in our data we cannot account for the selection of the patents 
listed in the Orange Book.  
The average effect of our measure of patent types reduces the possibility of a 
favorable outcome for a generic manufacturer. While these types of patents are more 
likely to be challenged, they do not guarantee a positive outcome for the Paragraph IV 
applicant. In addition, given the results of our models with interactions, the negative 
effect seems to be driven only by internal patents. 
Surprisingly, we do not find evidence of an increase in the hazard of generic wins 
when litigated patents are listed after the introduction of the MMA. If it is true that 
patents listed after a litigation has begun are weaker patents (Bulow, 2004), then one 
would expect an increase in the probability of them being either invalid or not infringed. 
By allowing only one automatic 30-month stay period, the Medicare reform has reduced 
the litigation costs and, in turn, increased the generic incentives to apply for a Paragraph 
IV certification. However, the reform has not affected the possibility of a successful 
Paragraph IV application. 
Interestingly, we find that patent characteristics such as claims and forward 
citations have no effect on the lawsuit outcomes. In contrast, a higher number of 
backward citations positively increases the hazard of a generic win. Patents with more 
backward citations may be less innovative since they rely more extensively on existing 
technologies; therefore, it may be easier to demonstrate the invalidity of the patents. 
Following Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), we also believe that the “insignificance” of 
patent characteristics is still an important result. In particular, it may be possible that 
lawsuit outcomes are independent of observed characteristics of patents (Lanjouw and 
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Schankerman, 2004). Similarly, (Allison and Lemley, 1998) find no significant patent 
variables among their covariates that affect the validity of patent lawsuits. They suggest 
that possible explanatory variables should include the use of experts and witnesses, the 
skills of lawyers and the amount of money spent on litigation.  
While we are unable to control for other lawsuit variables as suggested by Allison 
and Lemley (1998), we are able to proxy the willingness to protect the drug by using the 
relative drug importance at the sales and promotion level. We assume that pharmaceutical 
firms would adopt a more aggressive defensive strategy, like hiring more skilled lawyers, 
for drugs that represent a high volume of sales or have benefited from higher levels of 
sunk costs such as promotion investments. Our findings confirm that only the relative 
investment in promotions has a negative effect on the hazard of generic entry. We 
conclude that pharmaceutical companies tend to give higher protection to those drugs 
with high levels of marketing costs.  
As expected, we find that the hazard of a successful Paragraph IV application 
increases with the number of challengers. Pharmaceutical companies may face litigation 
costs that are too high when more than one applicant is involved in the lawsuit. Finally, if 
TEVA Pharmaceutical is among the Paragraph IV challengers, the likelihood of a generic 
win increases. This result can be explained by the peculiar strategy adopted by TEVA, 
which tends to challenge an extensive number of drugs without focusing on specific 
markets. It is possible that TEVA has developed unique experiences and capabilities that 





4.6. Discussion and conclusion 
By relying on the markets for technology and patent-litigation streams of 
literature, our study provides novel insights on the role of acquired technologies and on 
the impact of policy changes in patent litigations. First, we find evidence that external 
patents are more reliable than those developed internally. In fact, our results suggest that 
external technologies reduce the possibility that generic manufacturers are able to 
successfully defend their Paragraph IV applications. It follows that acquired patents can 
delay competitors’ market entry. However, they are not able to prevent or reduce the 
hazard of patent litigations. Second, we find evidence that the introduction of the MMA 
increased patent litigations in the pharmaceutical industry. Third, we support prior 
findings of the dominant role of sales in increasing the incentives of generic producers to 
enter the market. 
We use a unique dataset on patent litigations to examine whether external patents 
are more reliable than those developed internally. Our empirical context is the 
pharmaceutical industry and litigations regulated under the Paragraph IV certifications 
requested by generic manufacturers. This paper expands our understanding of the 
importance of acquired patents in protecting future downstream revenues. It is commonly 
accepted that acquired technologies can increase innovative productivity, generate 
knowledge spillovers and create unique synergies with existing internal competences 
(Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Arora et al., 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; 
Ceccagnoli et al., 2011; Gans et al., 2002). However, there is a lack of explorative 




The empirical analyses support the idea that acquired patents may be of higher 
quality than those developed internally. We find evidence that external technologies 
reduce the possibility that generic manufacturers enter the market prior to patent 
expiration. There are two possible explanations for this result. First, pharmaceutical 
companies can effectively select the best patent available in the market (Arora et al., 
2009). As new branded drugs are introduced under the early threat of generic entry, the 
required level of innovativeness should be very high to maintain a dominant market 
position and reduce generic competition. It follows that the role played by external 
technology becomes crucial in protecting marketed products and the stream of future 
revenues generated by the new product. Backward citations represent the innovative step 
of the new technology and measure how much the innovation relies on prior art (Lemley 
and Shapiro, 2005). Among the challenged patents, the difference in the average numbers 
of backward citations supports the idea that external technologies may be of better 
quality. In fact, external patents include only 14 backward citations compared to the 
internal patents that include 20. It follows that a lower number of backward citations 
characterizes more innovative technologies that may be less likely to be considered 
invalid when confronted with Paragraph IV challenges. 
Second, a successful patent scrutiny process may favor the selection of patents 
that strengthen the innovative process by creating synergies with internal capabilities 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Ceccagnoli et al., 2011) and helping to fulfill production 
pipelines (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). The due diligence performed by branded 
companies allows the selection of patents that complement internal technologies; external 
technologies may be able to fill the gaps left from internal patent protection. As pointed 
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out by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), companies can enjoy “enforcement spillovers” 
by combining multiple patents to increase portfolio size, thus reducing litigation 
uncertainty. The growth in portfolio size through external patents increases the 
bargaining power of branded firms, which can leverage their position with regard to the 
potential threat of entrants. 
Our results also provide an empirical test of the impact of the MMA. The 
regression analyses confirm that the introduction of the new legislation has favored the 
increase of Paragraph IV challenges by lowering litigation costs and uncertainty for 
generic manufacturers, although it didn’t have any effect on the litigation outcomes. The 
lack of results on court decisions should not be surprising, given the scope of the 
legislation. In fact, the MMA had two primary effects that didn’t change the court's 
decision process. First, it modified the attribution of the 180-day exclusivity from a 
patent-by-patent system to a product-based system, incentivizing a litigation race by 
generic manufacturers. Second, based on our results, the legislation successfully limited 
the evergreening strategy. Generic manufacturers face lower litigation costs and briefer 
wait times since pharmaceutical companies are not able to strategically manipulate the 
system by listing additional patents in the Orange Book to obtain an extension of the 30-
month stay period (Bulow, 2004). As a consequence, the MMA increased the incentive to 
initiate a Paragraph IV certification but it did not regulate the legal environment in ways 
that might affect the litigation outcome. 
Finally, we confirm the importance of sales as a primary incentive to enter the 
Paragraph IV challenge. Prior studies have already demonstrated the importance of sales 
for generic entry in general (Scott Morton, 1999, 2000) or after patent expiration 
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(Grabowski and Kyle, 2007). It has also been shown that sales affect the intensity of 
challenges, conditional on a challenge occurring (Berndt et al., 2007; Hemphill and 
Sampat, 2011). Our empirical evidence supports the idea that sales are the most important 
incentive for Paragraph IV challenges. Generic manufacturers target more profitable 
markets. In particular, the first generic entrant can gain substantial benefits from the 180-
day exclusivity period granted by the current legislation (Higgins and Graham, 2009). 
Our approach provides a better understanding of the reliability of acquired patents 
by integrating the choice of market entry with the markets for technology. Our findings 
suggest that external patents do not influence the decision to initiate patent challenges. 
However, they significantly increase the probability of winning a lawsuit which, in turn, 
prevents market entry. We also find that the introduction of the MMA has lowered 
litigation costs for generic manufacturers and increased the hazard of being challenged. 
The results of the MMA suggest that generic manufacturers can take advantage of this 
new legislation that has lowered the barriers to entry.  
In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, the implications of these policy 
changes are reflected in potential welfare increases for consumers. For example, in the 
hypertension market, Branstetter et al. (2011) find that consumers benefit from a total of 
$92 billion due to Paragraph IV generic entries, while pharmaceutical producers lose 
approximately $14 billion. In the short run, these results suggest a potential benefit to the 
society, but in the long run, the prospect of limited profitability of new drugs may reduce 





CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Paragraph IV (drug level) 8257 0.093 0.291 0 1 
Paragraph IV (patent level) 8257 0.072 0.259 0 1 
Paragraph IV outcome 718 0.491 0.501 0 1 
Sales 8257 333,039.6 823,264.4 0 8,216,271 
External technology 8257 0.492 0.499 0 1 
backward citation 8257 17.292 37.867 0 276 
Claims 8257 20.454 22.342 1 396 
Forward citation 8257 21.451 32.982 0 387 
Medicare Act 8257 0.294 0.456 0 1 
Patent per Innovation 8257 4.127 3.086 1 18 
Method Patent 8116 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Composition patent 8116 0.328 0.469 0 1 
Drug Delivery patent 8116 0.135 0.341 0 1 
Product Patent 8116 0.264 0.441 0 1 
Extra-time 8257 5.673 3.540 0 15 
Newest patent 8257 0.454 0.497 0 1 
Challengers 8257 0.171 0.803 0 15 
Teva 8257 0.023 0.152 0 1 
Relative drug importance 8017 0.105 0.220 0 1 




Table 4.2. Correlation Table 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1.Paragraph IV (patent level) 1                   
2.Paragraph IV outcome -0.030 1                  
3.Sales -0.045 -0.054 1                 
4.External technology -0.062 -0.037 -0.040 1                
5.Backward citation 0.077 -0.021 -0.123 -0.051 1               
6.Claims 0.064 -0.071 0.031 0.130 0.327 1              
7.Forward citation -0.160 -0.003 0.201 0.062 -0.115 -0.030 1             
8.Medicare Act 0.134 -0.138 -0.211 0.092 0.175 0.204 -0.064 1            
9.Patent per Innovation -0.091 0.153 0.463 -0.096 0.083 0.107 0.006 -0.022 1           
10.Method Patent 0.063 0.046 0.007 -0.068 -0.075 0.043 -0.149 0.007 0.141 1          
11.Composition patent -0.017 0.021 0.016 -0.038 -0.059 -0.004 0.000 0.072 -0.091 -0.432 1         
12.Drug Delivery patent -0.016 -0.029 -0.180 0.147 0.379 0.110 0.001 0.073 -0.025 -0.221 -0.287 1        
13.Product Patent -0.048 -0.056 0.113 0.000 -0.145 -0.122 0.175 -0.154 -0.025 -0.316 -0.412 -0.210 1       
14.Extra-time 0.098 -0.055 0.185 -0.120 0.015 -0.077 0.001 -0.369 -0.015 0.049 -0.108 -0.038 0.101 1      
15.Newest patent 0.145 0.036 -0.112 -0.073 -0.028 0.019 -0.221 0.079 -0.308 0.127 0.102 -0.086 -0.173 -0.010 1     
16.Challengers 0.119 0.193 0.096 -0.038 -0.050 -0.034 0.024 0.031 0.003 0.014 0.007 -0.054 -0.001 -0.081 -0.004 1    
17.Teva 0.061 -0.052 0.046 -0.032 -0.086 -0.008 -0.004 0.071 0.016 -0.026 -0.012 -0.062 0.090 -0.094 -0.010 0.148 1   
18.Relative drug importance 0.020 -0.040 0.325 0.015 -0.048 0.010 -0.007 0.034 0.314 0.239 -0.112 -0.096 -0.033 0.027 -0.043 0.027 0.054 1  
19.Relative sunk cost 0.048 -0.074 0.111 -0.007 -0.004 0.007 -0.044 0.178 0.242 0.193 -0.117 -0.041 -0.014 -0.120 -0.068 -0.009 0.121 0.766 1 
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Table 4.3 Hazard model of Paragraph IV application (drug level) 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, Coefficient are reported 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 











  (0.0608) (0.0615) (0.0639) (0.0642) (0.0671)  
External Patents (%)   0.114 0.167 0.147 0.0881 -0.0450 
   (0.177) (0.179) (0.171) (0.183) (0.201) 





      (0.200) (0.198) 





     (0.439) (0.424) (0.490) 
Composition Patents (%)     0.660 0.499 1.010
**
 
    (0.437) (0.438) (0.477) 
Drug Delivery Patents 
(%) 
    0.544 0.524 0.963
**
 
    (0.454) (0.434) (0.469) 
Product Patents (%)     0.0533 -0.0385 0.814
*
 
     (0.423) (0.428) (0.470) 
Claims (Avg.)    0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Back Citations (Avg.)    0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Forward Citations (Avg.)    -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 0.00001 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
New Patents (Count) 0.106 0.0964 0.103 0.0706 0.0332 0.0950 0.0980 
 (0.206) (0.196) (0.197) (0.190) (0.181) (0.183) (0.201) 
Patent per Innovation 0.0687 0.0138 0.0139 0.0154 0.0128 -0.0243 0.0383 
 (0.0465) (0.0386) (0.0388) (0.0381) (0.0388) (0.0364) (0.0476) 
Extra-time 0.0303 0.0103 0.0138 -0.00001 -0.0441 -0.0960
*
 -0.0437 
 (0.0627) (0.0570) (0.0565) (0.0573) (0.0578) (0.0537) (0.0608) 
ATC Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3336 3336 3336 3336 3336 3336 3336 
Log-Likelihood -1326.1 -1283.3 -1283.1 -1281.2 -1277.4 -1267.2 -1311.7 
Cluster 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 
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Table 4.4 Hazard model of Paragraph IV application (patent level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sales (log)      0.369
***
 
      (0.0547) 
External Patents   -0.156 -0.183 -0.162 -0.197 -0.196 
  (0.145) (0.144) (0.141) (0.142) (0.140) 





     (0.141) (0.140) 





    (0.654) (0.660) (0.546) 





    (0.742) (0.755) (0.669) 







    (0.516) (0.506) (0.394) 





    (0.659) (0.665) (0.535) 









   (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 





   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Forward Citations    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 




 0.171 0.151 0.0734 0.0272 
 (0.111) (0.113) (0.117) (0.120) (0.119) (0.110) 











 (0.0312) (0.0314) (0.0313) (0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0273) 





 (0.928) (0.996) (1.109) (2.617) (2.716) (2.938) 
ATC Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4810 4810 4810 4810 4810 4810 
Log-Likelihood -3192.2 -3191.5 -3186.3 -3175.1 -3164.3 -3120.7 
Cluster 468 468 468 468 468 468 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***




Table 4.4 Hazard model of Paragraph IV application (patent level) - Continued 
Standard errors in parentheses,   
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sales (log)      0.366*** 
      (0.053) 




 -0.704 -0.499 
 (0.154) (0.184) (0.818) (0.182) (0.744) (0.658) 







    (0.149) (0.151) (0.144) 







   (0.233) (0.256) (0.248) 





   (0.738) (0.631) (0.694) (0.559) 
Product Patents x External Patent   -0.181  0.0938 -0.0314 
   (0.846)  (0.732) (0.646) 





   (0.860) (0.716) (0.809) (0.702) 
Drug Delivery Patents x External 
Patent 
  -0.207  -0.0948 0.118 
  (0.958)  (0.777) (0.692) 





   (0.605) (0.487) (0.572) (0.422) 
Composition Patents x External 
Patent  
  0.00856  0.262 0.218 
  (0.856)  (0.734) (0.647) 





   (0.737) (0.631) (0.690) (0.538) 
Method Patents x External Patent   -0.182  0.0213 -0.251 
   (0.907)  (0.796) (0.699) 




 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) 
Claims x External Patent  0.006
***





  (0.002)   (0.003) (0.002) 







  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Back Citations x External Patent  -0.004   -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.005)   (0.005) (0.004) 
Forward Citations   -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Forward Citations x External 
Patent 
 0.004   0.005 0.002 
  (0.004)   (0.004) (0.003) 
New Patents  0.230
*
 0.150 0.154 0.062 0.074 0.034 
 (0.127) (0.122) (0.122) (0.117) (0.136) (0.126) 
New Patents x External Patent -0.0770    -0.0707 -0.0596 
 (0.261)    (0.285) (0.260) 











 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) 







 (0.985) (1.123) (2.648) (2.592) (2.519) (2.864) 
ATC Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4810 4810 4810 4810 4810 4810 
Log-Likelihood -3191.4 -3183.9 -3174.8 -3161.5 -3157.7 -3115.9 
Cluster 468 468 468 468 468 468 
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Table 4.5 Hazard model of lawsuit outcome (patent level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









  (0.181) (0.185) (0.205) (0.203) 
Medicare Act     0.408 
     (0.248) 





    (0.876) (0.847) 





    (1.240) (1.184) 





    (0.263) (0.301) 





    (0.837) (0.801) 
Claims   0.001 -0.005 -0.005 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 





   (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Forward Citations   -0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
New Patent -0.0555 -0.121 -0.127 -0.0761 -0.160 
 (0.0988) (0.100) (0.108) (0.116) (0.118) 
Patent per Innovation 0.0775 0.0358 0.0350 0.0417 0.0174 












 (0.209) (0.212) (0.213) (0.215) (0.212) 









 (0.0706) (0.0692) (0.0693) (0.0768) (0.0853) 
Drug importance (sales) -0.993 -1.048 -0.992 -0.370 -0.230 
 (0.757) (0.777) (0.759) (0.824) (0.840) 











 (0.701) (0.713) (0.703) (0.708) (0.740) 





 (1.133) (1.156) (1.250) (7.148) (6.678) 
ATC Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 428 428 428 428 428 
Log-Likelihood -1122.4 -1118.3 -1118.2 -1112.3 -1110.7 
Cluster 231 231 231 231 231 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***




Table 4.5 Hazard model of lawsuit outcome (patent level) - Continued 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
  












 (0.164) (0.202) (0.269) (0.204) (0.627) 
Medicare Act    0.408
*
 0.352 
    (0.242) (0.237) 
Medicare Act x External Patents    -0.00167 0.344 
    (0.299) (0.355) 





   (0.918) (0.846) (0.850) 
Product Patents x External Patent   0.00263  0.489 
   (0.320)  (0.635) 





   (1.462) (1.183) (1.286) 
Drug Delivery Patents x External Patent   0.407  1.189 
   (0.763)  (0.893) 





   (0.271) (0.310) (0.286) 
Composition Patents x External Patent   -0.151  0.343 
   (0.390)  (0.672) 





   (0.859) (0.799) (0.789) 
Method Patents x External Patent   -0.539  -0.170 
   (0.444)  (0.665) 





  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Claims x External Patent  0.006   0.005 
  (0.006)   (0.005) 







  (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Back Citations x External Patent  -0.020   -0.016 
  (0.021)   (0.018) 
Forward Citations  -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Forward Citations x External Patent  0.002   -0.001 
  (0.003)   (0.004) 
New Patent -0.083 -0.088 -0.097 -0.005 -0.140 
 (0.092) (0.106) (0.106) (0.117) (0.107) 
New Patent x External Patent -0.141    -0.149 












 (0.213) (0.220) (0.211) (0.212) (0.207) 






 0.107 0.117 
 (0.0699) (0.0692) (0.0760) (0.0860) (0.0846) 
Drug importance (sales) -1.024 -0.780 -0.306 -0.230 0.106 
 (0.769) (0.772) (0.798) (0.868) (0.798) 











 (0.696) (0.723) (0.741) (0.724) (0.770) 







 (1.144) (1.237) (7.313) (6.709) (6.689) 
ATC Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 428 428 428 428 428 
Log-Likelihood -1118.2 -1116.8 -1111.5 -1110.7 -1108.6 




Figure 4.1 Paragraph IV challenge description 
Source: Re-adapted from Bulow (2004) 
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(b) Hazard Function by sales 








In this dissertation, I have attempted to highlight the central role of licensed 
technologies as drivers of firm-level innovative outcomes. However, in contrast to 
extensive existing research that focuses on the importance of markets for technology and 
the antecedents of licensing, I examine the significance of in-licensing investments. It is 
crucial to understand when acquired technologies generate synergies with existing 
capabilities, as they are more reliable than patents developed internally. I rely on the 
markets for technology framework as the primary conceptual lens to analyze drivers of 
complementarity and the knowledge assimilation process. I also use litigation literature to 
focus on the role of external patents in intellectual property rights lawsuits. As a result, 
the main contribution of this dissertation is to highlight the impact of in-licensing on 
different firm-level performance variables: the ability of an organization to generate 
synergies between types of R&D investments, the capacity of an organization to 
assimilate and adopt new knowledge when the existing knowledge stock is high, and the 
capability of an organization to effectively select and use external patents in “Paragraph 
IV challenges.” 
In more details, in the first chapter I show that on average the relationship 
between in-licensing and internal R&D is neither that of a substitute nor a complement 
but that the level of complementarity differs between different levels of scientific 
publications and absorptive capacity, thus suggesting that firms with high levels of 
publications and large R&D stock are better able to integrate external technologies. In 
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addition, companies may be able to use knowledge across therapeutic areas additively 
and therefore experience better levels of complementarity. Finally, complementarity 
increase for firms with a larger stock of prior licensing experience. In other words, 
experience in licensing agreements may facilitate the management and integration of the 
acquired technologies. 
In the second chapter, results suggest thath reliance on internal knowledge 
negatively moderates the impact of licensing on firm performance. It may be possible that 
internal knowledge accumulation favors the development of an inward oriented process 
and, as a consequence, firms may suffer from the Not Invented Here syndrome and have 
negative biases towards external knowledge. This negative effect is moderated through 
two mechanisms: high level of absorptive capacity and decentralized organizational 
structure. The results have important managerial implications. This bias towards external 
technologies may limit the adoption of open innovation strategies and the exploitation of 
external technologies. As a consequence, firms need to create fuzzier organizational 
boundaries to incentivize both internal knowledge accumulation and external knowledge 
adoption. 
In the third chapter, I find that external technologies are more reliable than 
internally developed patents. The hazard of a Paragraph IV challenge is independent of 
the types of patents linked to the drug but it mainly depends on the level of sales, which 
is directly related to market profitability. However, external patents increase the 
probability that a branded firm wins the litigation suit; therefore, they prevent generic 
manufacturers from entering the market. There are two explanations for this result: first, 
pharmaceutical companies can effectively select the best external patents and second, the 
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